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SMART CONTRACTS AND CONSUMERS

Tatiana Cutts*
ABSTRACT
“Smart contracts” are a way of using computers to make contracts
unbreakable. Contracting parties do not need to trust one another to perform or
rely upon intermediaries to enforce performance. Performance is guaranteed.
This is supposed to be a victory for the ordinary person—a clever socioeconomic application of cryptography that strips power from companies and
governments and gives it to consumers. But it turns out that less trust does not
mean more freedom, or better bargains. The law of contract supports valuable
relationships both by enforcing duties and by allowing parties to escape the
consequences of ill-formed contracts and oppressive terms. Smart contracts
remove these safeguards; consumers may be bound, inexorably and without
recourse, to contracts that lack any virtue. The lesson of smart contracting is
clear and urgent: when we design the future of commerce, we should direct our
resources towards building, not emaciating, relationships of trust.
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INTRODUCTION

What should the law do about autonomous machines?1 Lawmakers have
grappled with that question for thousands of years. Two millennia before Roman
Law emerged in a systemic form,2 Babylonian codes apportioned liability for
various devices that were (in whole or part) self-operating.3 As technological
practices have matured, attention has turned to the questions raised by digital
automation.4 And as computers have become more closely integrated into
“Automation” is “the fact of making something . . . automatic.” Automation, OXFORD ENG.
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13468?redirectedFrom=automation#eid (last
visited Sept. 25, 2019). “[A]utomatic” is either “self-generated, spontaneous,” “self-acting; having
the power of motion within itself” or it is (more specifically) “having intrinsic activity that is not
dependent
upon
external
stimuli.”
Automatic,
OXFORD
ENG.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13464?redirectedFrom=automatic#eid (last visited Sept. 25,
2019).
1

2

Internal evidence suggests that the Institutes of Gaius were completed around A.D. 161.
BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 36 (1976).
3

The Code of Hammurabi contains several rules that concern, inter alia, man-made dams that
had not been maintained “in proper condition.” The Code of Hammurabi, LILLIAN GOLDMAN L.
LIBR., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). Other rules
concern partially self-operating devices, including boats and horse-drawn carts, and wholly
autonomous “property,” such as slaves. Id.
4
For one of the best-known treatises concerning the regulation of “cyberspace,” see
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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commercial practice and social habit, the more complex these questions have
become: Can code embed moral values?5 To what extent should code writers be
held accountable for their creations? How does online automation affect the way
in which standards of behaviour are regulated?6
The novel and much-celebrated practice of “smart contracting”7 brings
such questions into sharp focus. The promise is broad and optimistic—better
facilities for expressing contractual rights and duties in computer code and more
sophisticated methods for making sure that that code operates as intended.8 In
this way, smart contracts oil the wheels of digital commerce.9 But a purely
economic account of smart contracting would be incomplete. A core ideological
commitment of this contractual renaissance is to empower individuals to bargain
on a peer-to-peer basis, without so-called “trusted third parties”10—whether
commercial intermediaries (such as banks and marketplace-hosts) or public
authorities (such as courts).

5
One recent manifestation of that question arises in the context of self-driving cars. See
generally LANCE ELIOT, AI SELF-DRIVING CARS BREAKTHROUGHS: PRACTICAL ADVANCES IN
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING (2018); Jessica S. Brodsky, Autonomous
Vehicle Regulation: How an Uncertain Legal Landscape May Hit The Brakes on Self-Driving
Cars, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 851 (2016); Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous
Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 1611 (2017).
6
And if so, which states, and when? The questions of jurisdiction, or “choice of law,” are
particularly fraught. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict
of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005)
(discussing this question as it relates to the internet).

The term “smart contract” was coined by Nick Szabo in a blog post entitled “Smart
Contracts.” Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, PHONETIC SCI. AMSTERDAM (1994),
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwintersch
ool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html [hereinafter Smart Contracts] (describing a
smart contract as “a computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract”); see
also Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, SATOSHI
NAKAMOTO INST. (1997), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/formalizing-securing-relationships/.
8
PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE
78–80 (2018) [hereinafter THE RULE OF CODE]. Smart contracts are “more dynamic”; “what makes
smart contracts unique is that they grant contracting parties new tools to reduce monitoring
costs . . . any . . . performance obligations will only execute according to the terms and conditions
expressly provided for in the underlying code.” Id. at 80.
7

9

Kevin Werbach & Nicholas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 318 (2017).
“Algorithmic enforcement allows contracts to be executed as quickly and cheaply as other
computer code. Cost savings occur at every stage, from negotiation to enforcement, especially in
replacing judicial enforcement with automated mechanisms.” Id. at 335.
10
This term was used by an author or group of authors writing under the pseudonym “Satoshi
Nakamoto” in Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN, at 1,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2019). The legal implications of Internet
disintermediation were explored two decades ago. Andrew L. Shapiro, Digital Middlemen and the
Architecture of Electronic Commerce, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 795, 795–812 (1998).
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As yet, there is little rigorous writing on smart contracts,11 but those few
accounts generally agree upon three things. The first, and perhaps defining,
feature of a smart contract is that it is unbreakable.12 It not only self-operates
(positive automation); it also precludes outside influence (negative
automation).13 There is no need for a contracting party to trust their counterparty
to perform, or any intermediary to secure performance. Performance is
inevitable.
The second, related claim is that smart contracts are designed to be (and
are in fact) non-justiciable.14 Commentators present this either as the idea that
smart contracts admit no legal oversight at all,15 or as a matter of independent
normative ecology; if there are rules that apply to smart contracts, no territorial
State has a role in making and applying them.16 Thus, smart contracts are both
“self-executing” and “self-enforcing.”17 These characteristics are usually

11
The few articles include: Simon Geiregat, Cryptocurrencies Are (Smart) Contracts, 34
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 1144 (2018); Sarah Green, Smart Contracts, Interpretation and
Rectification, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 234 (2018); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Persistence of
Dumb Contracts, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1 (2019); Max Raskin, The Law and Legality
of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305 (2017); Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0:
‘Smart’ Contracts as the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law, 26 INFO. & COM. TECH.
L. 116 (2017); Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 263 (2017); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9; Michèle Finck, Smart Contracts as a Form of
Solely Automated Processing Under the GDPR, 2 (Jan. 8, 2019) (Max Planck Institute for
Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 19-01); Gabriel Olivier Benjamin Jaccard, Smart
Contracts and the Role of Law, JUSLETTER I.T. 23 § 3 (Nov. 2017); see also Aaron Wright &
Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia,
(Mar.
12,
2015)
(unpublished)
(available
at
https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2015/uploads/proposal_background_paper/SSRNid2580664.pdf).
12
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 318 (Smart contracts “eliminate the act of remediation,
by admitting no possibility of breach.” The only input required is the single trigger event.).
13
Beyond the trigger event, positive automation is the ability to operate without outside input;
negative automation precludes such input.
14
Wright & De Filippi, supra note 11, at 50 (arguing that this requires “at a minimum a
redefinition of how laws and regulations are designed, implemented, and enforced”).
15
See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 350 (smart contracts “supersede legal
enforcement”).
16
See generally Vili Lehdonvirta, The Blockchain Paradox: Why Distributed Ledger
Technologies May Do Little to Transform the Economy, OXFORD INTERNET INST. (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/blog/the-blockchain-paradox-why-distributed-ledger-technologies-maydo-little-to-transform-the-economy/.
17
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 320. I have called the “self-executing” nature of smart
contracts negative automation: the point is not just that they operate without input, but that they
preclude operational input. See also KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW
ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 64 (2018) (“[F]or all practical purposes, the machine is the entirety of
the contractual environment. It needs no human intervention, either to perform the contract or to
resolve disputes in court.”).
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attributed to the technology that underpins the cryptocurrency “Bitcoin,” called
“blockchain technology.”18
The final point of consensus is that this is a good thing—for business
certainly, but for consumers, too. For some, the potential is almost limitless:
smart contracting will “transform law, finance, and civil society.”19 For others,
the message is subtler: smart contracting represents the “mature end of the
evolution of electronic agreements over several decades.”20 But most agree that,
by limiting intermediation and operational interference, smart contracts enhance
efficiency, transparency, and granular control.21
The vision that emerges from these three claims is both utopian and
classically liberal. Parties can digitize and automate contracts in such a way as
to immunize performance from interference in tempore22 and ex post.23 They can,
in this sense, transact within a domain free from State supervision.24
The claims are easy to recite, but harder to illustrate. Commentators use
a familiar archetype: just as a vending machine collects payment and (usually)
delivers the chosen item in an observable, tamper-proof way, “smart contracting”
describes the automated delivery of digital assets.25 Smart contracts are, in this

18
WERBACH, supra note 17 (“[S]mart contracts turn a distributed ledger into a distributed
computer.”); Gideon Greenspan, Beware the Impossible Smart Contract: The Three Most Common
Smart
Contract
Misconceptions,
MULTICHAIN
(Apr.
12,
2016),
https://www.multichain.com/blog/2016/04/beware-impossible-smart-contract/ (“A smart contract
is a piece of code which is stored on a blockchain, triggered by blockchain transactions, and which
reads and writes data in that blockchain’s database.”); Jaccard, supra note 11; Sklaroff, supra note
11, at 273 (“agreements built in computer code and stored on a blockchain”).
19
Jim Epstein, Here Comes Ethereum, An Information Technology Dreamed Up by a
Wunderkind 19-Year-Old that Could One Day Transform Law, Finance, and Civil Society,
REASON (Mar. 19, 2015, 12:10 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2015/03/19/here-comes-ethereum-aninformation-techn; see also Wright & De Filippi, supra note 11, at 3 (“The blockchain has the
potential to usher in a new era characterized by global payment systems, digital assets,
decentralized governance, and even decentralized legal systems.”).
20
21

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 317.
Id.

Green, supra note 11, at 234 (Smart contracts are “self-executing agreements”; they cannot
be interrupted by the parties themselves or third parties.).
22

23

Savelyev, supra note 11, at 127 (“Smart contract [sic] does not need any legal institutions
to exist.”).
24

This echoes claims made in the early years of the Internet. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 3–8.
This was the example that Szabo employed in his 1997 blog post. Smart Contracts, supra
note 7. Szabo envisaged that smart contracts would transcend the vending machine, allowing users
to “embed contracts in all sorts of property that is valuable and controlled by digital means.” Id.
This is now the “go-to” example for commentators. See, e.g., WERBACH, supra note 17, at 64–65
(“[V]ending machines work as proto-smart contracts because they sell items of low value, operate
face to face, and take cash. . . . Distributed ledgers make it possible to implement similar
arrangements digitally, across networks, for any kind of asset or agreement, without any trusted
actor.”).
25
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sense, a sort of “virtual vending machine.”26 And it is generally understood that
all of this was made possible by the advent of blockchain technology in 2008.27
Yet, fundamental questions remain unanswered: Are smart contracts a type of a
computer code,28 a type of contract,29 or both?30 Which tasks can only be
accomplished, or can be accomplished more easily, using smart contracts?
Precisely what role does blockchain technology play? Without answers to these
questions, it is impossible to offer a robust critique of the practice of smart
contracting. Accordingly, this Article has two goals that are—in light of the
paucity of academic literature—equally important. The first is descriptive: I
explain what “smart contracts” are, and how they differ from the commercial
tools that we already have. The second is normative: I consider whether smart
contracting offers, on balance, a better way of facilitating valuable commitments.
I address the explanatory task in Part II. The purpose of smart
contracting, I show, is to make contractual performance tamper-proof. This is
where Bitcoin comes in. By crowdsourcing31 the task of transferring an asset
from A to B,32 blockchain technology ensures that no single person controls or

26

Sklaroff, supra note 11, at 271 (a “virtual machine”).

27

So that there is a relationship of causal and material equivalence between these two tools. I
call the protocols that support blockchain technology “blind consensus protocols.” See infra notes
84–106 and accompanying text. Blockchain technology, as we will see, provides a mechanism for
persuading disparate actors to come to a dynamic consensus about a particular distribution of
holdings, without the visible anchor of physical control.
28
See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, PA. J.L. & INNOVATION
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2); A Primer on Smart Contracts, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION (Nov. 27, 2018), at 4, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/201811/LabCFTC_PrimerSmartContracts112718.pdf (“a set of coded computer functions”).
29
See, e.g., THE RULE OF CODE, supra note 8, at 72–88 (distinguishing between smart contracts
as legal agreements, and “smart contract code”); see also Geiregat, supra note 11; Wright & De
Filippi, supra note 11, at 10–11 (“digital, computable contracts where the performance and
enforcement of contractual conditions occur automatically, without the need for human
intervention”).
30

See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 341–42.
Crowdsourcing is “the practice of obtaining information or services by soliciting input from
a large number of people, typically via the internet and often without offering compensation.”
Crowdsourcing,
OXFORD
ENG.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/376403#eid288590739 (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
32
See Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum White Paper: A Next Generation Smart Contract &
Decentralized
Application
Platform,
ETHEREUM,
at
4,
http://blockchainlab.com/pdf/Ethereum_white_papera_next_generation_smart_contract_and_decentralized_application_platform-vitalik-buterin.pdf
(last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (describing Bitcoin as a system for “decentralized consensus” as to
who owns what); see also Wright & De Filippi, supra note 11, at 5 (“Prior to the invention of the
blockchain, it simply was not possible to coordinate individual activities over the Internet without
a centralized body ensuring that no one has tampered with the data.”).
31
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can frustrate performance.33 I complete Part II with two key distinctions—
between computer code and contract, and between positive and negative
automation. While the term “smart contract” has been used in a variety of ways,
its “core case” is not a legal contract, but rather a type of code. A smart contract
is computer code that negatively automates contractual performance.34
With this picture in mind, I turn in Part III to the justificatory task. I
show that, while negative automation guarantees counter-performance, it also
has two significant downsides: it exposes parties to a greater risk of fraud and
malicious hacking and makes it almost impossible for parties to avoid the impact
of contracts that suffer from some serious defect in formative consent.35 And this,
I argue, counts—plainly and weightily—against the claim to consumer
empowerment.
The law of contract strikes a careful balance between encouraging
parties to abide by their promises and allowing parties to escape from ill-formed
contracts.36 In so doing, it supports and protects valuable relationships of trust
and cooperation. The lesson taught by this experiment of contractual technology
is simple but crucial: rather than trying to rid commerce of these relationships of
trust, we should foster the transparency and accountability that they need to
flourish.
II. EXPLAINING “SMART CONTRACTS”
In 1994, Nick Szabo introduced the idea of a “smart contract.”37 For
Szabo, this meant any “computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms

33
This is the idea that I have called “negative-automation”: by placing operational control
outside of the hands of any one person, blockchain technology makes it exceedingly difficult to
impede performance. I deal with the practical methods by which the Bitcoin Blockchain is made
secure below. Infra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
34
We will see that the term “smart contract” is used primarily by those who engage in the
Ethereum community to describe a type of code. Ethereum Homestead Documentation,
ETHEREUM, Mar. 1, 2017, at 71, https://buildmedia.readthedocs.org/media/pdf/ethereumhomestead/latest/ethereum-homestead.pdf (“A contract is a collection of code (its functions) and
data (its state) that resides at a specific address on the 34343434 blockchain.”).
35
On account of fraud, unconscionability, mistake, or some other unfair contract term
produced by a substantial imbalance in bargaining power. This problem is particularly acute for
those who are vulnerable, ill-informed, or who otherwise hold a bargaining position of relative
impotence.
36
In October 2018, Lord Hodge of the UK Supreme Court noted the importance of making
sure that technological innovation did not override the subtle ways in which the law might assist
those whose intent had been “vitiated.” Financial Technology: Opportunities and Challenges to
Law and Regulation, SUP. CT., Oct. 26, 2018, at 14, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech181026.pdf.
37

Smart Contacts, supra note 7.
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of a contract.”38 The basic idea was that “many kinds of contractual clauses . . .
can be embedded in the hardware and software we deal with” in such a way as
to “proactively enforce” performance.39 Szabo’s goals were twofold—to
increase transparency (“the ability of the [parties] to observe each others’ [sic]
performance of the contract”),40 and to improve accountability (to “focus
responsibility for the consequences of contract-related activity onto the
parties”).41
Little in this is unorthodox or new.42 Any program that automates access
to a particular service—whether infrastructure,43 educational or recreational
media,44 or some other aspect of ordinary life—uses computer code to execute a
legal contract. We interact with these programs often, and the advantages and
disadvantages are reasonably well understood.45 Yet, in all of these examples,
access to the relevant service depends upon the continued cooperation of the
service-provider; that service-provider provides the practical transactional
infrastructure and retains the ability to alter or impede contractual performance.
And here, Szabo hinted at a more disruptive vision—a way of taking counter
performance out of the control of one’s counterparty or any other actor,46 thereby
placing control back in the hands of the service-user.
Szabo chose to exemplify this vision by way of a “canonical real-life
example”: the “humble vending machine . . . takes in coins, and via a simple
mechanism . . . dispense [sic] change and product according to the displayed
price.”47 The point of Szabo’s analogy was this: by setting up contractual
exchange to self-operate in a way that precludes interference,48 the vending

38

Id.

39

Id.
Id.

40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Even in 1994, when Szabo was writing.
For example, contactless payment for public transport.
For example, paying to access an online newspaper.

45
Lessig’s treatise is comprehensive in its treatment of ethical risks. See generally LESSIG,
supra note 4. Jaron Lanier weaves a compelling case for introducing better systems for permitting
individuals to retain control over their data. See generally JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE
(2014); JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO (2011). For a directly political
approach, see generally JAMIE BARTLETT, THE DARK NET: INSIDE THE DIGITAL UNDERWORLD
(2015) [hereinafter BARTLETT, THE DARK NET]; JAMIE BARTLETT, THE PEOPLE VS TECH: HOW THE
INTERNET IS KILLING DEMOCRACY (AND HOW WE SAVE IT) (2018) [hereinafter BARTLETT, THE
PEOPLE VS TECH].
46
47
48

Whether intermediary or counterparty.
Smart Contracts, supra note 7.
Supra note 13 and accompanying text. This is what I have called negative automation.
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machine guarantees counter performance. Buyers do not need to place their trust
in any counterparty or intermediary. They may simply trust machines.49
For Szabo, the idea of a “smart contract” went beyond the vending
machine “in proposing to embed contracts in all sorts of property that is valuable
and controlled by digital means.”50 He exemplified this idea by way of an
instalment plan:51 the buyer receives a car in return for a promise to pay the price
in stages, and a smart contract transfers the car’s e-key to the owner
automatically if the buyer defaults. This arrangement, he said, would be “much
cheaper and more effective than a repo man,” would provide “better observation
and verification,” and better transactional security.52
The cryptocurrency known as “Bitcoin” was part of the machinery that
would facilitate Szabo’s vision of secure, peer-to-peer transactions in the digital
realm.53 That platform, first described in 200854 and launched in 2009,55 created
a mechanism for transferring digital coins without relying upon the infrastructure
of traditional financial intermediaries. Parties could now transfer digital assets
without banks and payment providers, on a peer-to-peer basis. Though limited
to one particular digital asset (“bitcoins”), the underlying technology
(“blockchain technology”) encompassed a set of tools that could be used for
many different kinds of digital assets.56
In the wake of the 2017 Bitcoin “Gold Rush,”57 Szabo’s ideas made their
way into mainstream academic literature. Szabo’s core case (the “humble
vending machine”) became prototypical, and his task of generalization was taken
up with zeal. As of 2019, blockchain technology has been identified as a rich

49
Sarah Green calls this “trustless” contracting. Green, supra note 11, at 236. Note, though,
that it is not wholly so: the point is that, rather than trusting that an individual will behave as
promised, the contracting party may trust the machine to perform the function that it has been set
up to perform.
50

Smart Contracts, supra note 7.
In the other common law countries, these arrangements are known as “hire purchase”
arrangements. See, e.g., EWAN MCKENDRICK, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 296 (5th ed. 2016).
52
Smart Contracts, supra note 7.
51

53
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 324. (“The development that made Szabo’s vision of
smart contracts more than a mere curiosity was Bitcoin.”).
54

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 4.
This was the point at which the first open-source bitcoin client was created, and the first
bitcoins “mined.”
56
Kevin Werbach, Trust, But Verify: Why Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 487, 518 (2018) (describing systems for “coloring” coins, by means of software that allocates
information about another (real-world or digital) asset to transaction metadata). In what follows,
we will consider other platforms that use the tools of Bitcoin to accommodate a variety of different
structures for owning and transferring a variety of different assets.
55

57
See, e.g., Olivier Huez, Bitcoin Frenzy: 19th Century Gold Rush Lessons for Crypto-Mining,
MEDIUM (Dec. 30, 2017), https://medium.com/c4-ventures/bitcoin-frenzy-19th-century-goldrush-lessons-for-crypto-mining-4befea10e163.
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field for negatively-automated transactions,58 from land and corporate share
registry,59 to pornography60 and seed-to-sale marijuana tracking.61 For all such
applications, the promise is one of better efficiency, greater transparency, and a
way of placing contractual control back in the hands of the individual consumer.
Yet, there is such a wide gap between the goals of technologists and
lawyers that the same terms adopt starkly different meanings. “Contract” has
proven particularly difficult. For legal commentators, the term describes a
particular type of bilateral relationship.62 For computer scientists, the term
describes a particular type of code.63 Still, others prefer to view code and contract
as a single device.64 Moreover, there are many different claims about the way in
which blockchain technology interacts with contractual automation.65 To
account for this variation, attempts to define “smart contracts” comprehensively
have been almost comically broad: “A smart contract is an automatable and
enforceable agreement. Automatable by computer, although some parts may
require human input and control. Enforceable either by legal enforcement of
rights and obligations or via tamper-proof execution of computer code.”66 These

58
UK GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN
21
(2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf/.
59
HM Land Registry to Explore the Benefits of Blockchain, GOV.UK (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hm-land-registry-to-explore-the-benefits-of-blockchain.
60
SpankChain, Introducing CryptoTitties: An Onboarding and Educational Tool to Finally
Give Titties Their Day on the Ethereum Blockchain, MEDIUM (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://medium.com/spankchain/introducing-cryptotitties-2d0b2df1fca5.
61
Brian Penny, Blockchain Buds: Tracking Cannabis from Seed to Sale, CRYPTO BRIEFING
(Sept. 2, 2018, 11:02 AM), https://cryptobriefing.com/cannabis-blockchain-seed-to-sale/.
62
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is
a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”); EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACT § 1–001 (13th ed. 2011) (“A contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations which
are enforced or recognized by law.”).
63

The best example of this usage is the Ethereum Homestead Documentation. See, e.g.,
Ethereum Homestead Documentation, supra note 34 (“A contract is a collection of code (its
functions) and data (its state) that resides at a specific address on the Ethereum blockchain.”).
64
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 341–42. They call smart contracts a “chunk of code,”
but conclude that “smart contracts are, at the conceptual level, still contracts.” Id. at 342.
65
For most, blockchain technology is a necessary prerequisite to smart contracts, but others
seek to keep the two conceptually distinct. See, e.g., Christopher D. Clack et al., Smart Contract
Templates: Foundations, Design Landscape and Research Directions, BARCLAYS BANK PLC, Mar.
15, 2017, at 2, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771.pdf; Raskin, supra note 11, at 306 (Smart contracts
are “agreements wherein execution is automated, usually by computers.”).
66
Clack et al., supra note 65 (calling this a “higher-level definition based on the two topics of
automation and enforceability”). These two topics are smart contracts as a legal contract and smart
contracts as code. Id.
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problems are not superficial or merely semantic. There is now a wide divergence
in substantive claims about the nature and impact of smart contracting,67 and the
relationship that it bears to blockchain technology and the established law of
contract.68
It is long past time for a clear exposition of precisely how Szabo’s vision
has come to be translated into a set of practical tools for digital commerce. The
goal of Part II of this article is to develop such an account. The goal of Part III is
to use that account to assess the merits of smart contracts.
A. Automating Asset-Sales: Creating Confidence in Counter Performance
by Limiting the Power for Intervention
In what follows, I explain what Szabo was asking us to imagine in 1994,
and why—25 years ago—it was what one might appropriately call “visionary.”
Through a step-by-step progression from real-world asset sales to automated
digital asset sales, I demonstrate what we need to build Szabo’s virtual vending
machine. The missing pieces of our commercial toolbox, I show, are: first, some
method for transferring digital assets directly from one person to another; and
second, a way of stopping sellers from altering or frustrating contractual
performance.
1. Buying and Selling Assets
In order to enter into an agreement for the sale of an asset (“X”), both
buyer (“B”) and seller (“S”) need to be satisfied of (at least) three things. First,
they must have consensus on material aspects of the sale: the parties must
identify X, the price (“P”), and how sale is to occur. Second, each party must be
sufficiently confident of counter performance. Wherever there is a way of
interrupting performance, this requires an element of trust. Each party must hope

67
See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 11, at 2–3 (claiming that “[w]e stand at the edge of a
new digital revolution” and that “the blockchain has the possibility to fundamentally change the
way people organize their affairs”). But see Kai Stinchcombe, Ten Years In, Nobody Has Come
Up with a Use for Blockchain, CNBC (Dec. 26, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/26/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-forblockchain.html [hereinafter Stinchcombe, Ten Years In]; Kai Stinchcombe, Blockchain Is Not
Only Crappy Technology But a Bad Vision for the Future, MEDIUM (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-amedieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec [hereinafter Stinchcombe, Blockchain] (arguing that “[t]here
is no single person in existence who had a problem they wanted to solve, discovered that an
available blockchain solution was the best way to solve it, and therefore became a blockchain
enthusiast”).
68
Green, supra note 11, at 235 (arguing that smart contracting supplements the law of contract:
“computers can now also be used to carry out the entire contractual process, from formation to
execution”); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 363 (arguing that smart contracting exists in an
“orthogonal” relationship with the law of contract).
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that the other will make good on their promise when the time for performance
arrives. Finally, each party must be sufficiently confident that, post-sale, the rest
of the world will behave as if B and S are entitled to X and P respectively. This
is usually termed security of receipt, though the idea is more specific than
continuing physical possession. It describes a successful change in the identity
of the person treated as entitled to deal with the relevant asset.69
The amount of reassurance B and S require at each stage varies
according to factors that include the type of asset, the value of X, and the
conditions of sale. Take the following Example 1.1:
Example 1.1: S owns and runs a convenience store. Soda is
advertised for sale at a price of $1/can. B selects a can, hands $1
to S at the counter, and exits the store with the drink.
In this example, consensus is reached through the price-label, and the
unarticulated terms incorporated by ordinary practice.70 Confidence in counter
performance comes from various sources—for B, physical possession of the can
and the store’s reputation,71 for each the possibility of legal recourse. The sources
of confidence in security of receipt overlap: possession, reputation, the paper
receipt, the physical parameters of the cash register, and the legal system that
underpins the contractual relationship. But by and large, neither party will
examine the circumstances of sale too hard. Because of the low value of the
goods and consideration, each is prepared to accept some risk.
Variations in the conditions of sale may, however, make the parties less
relaxed. If the store is located in an area in which petty crime rates are high, S
may decide to install surveillance equipment or employ security personnel. If the
asset is worth substantially more than $1, both parties are likely to require more
by way of reassurance.72 For certain assets, those cautionary steps are mandated
by law. The sale of a house, for instance, requires a deed of conveyance and
registration.
So, buyer and seller must agree upon some basic terms of sale and must
be confident that they can expect undisturbed possession (of the asset or its price)
after sale has taken place. The events necessary to generate that confidence vary
by context.

69

Or, more precisely, the person entitled to set the parameters for who is allowed to interact
with that asset.
70
For example, that the price label refers to any one of the described categories, the buyer can
obtain delivery immediately, etc.
71
Or the reputation of similar shops.
72
Those who purchase cars through eBay auctions will only part with money once they are
assured of physical possession and may require additional proof of no rival claims (by way of the
handbook and registration certificate).
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2. Automating Asset Sales
There is an old and simple mechanism by which the buyer may gain
absolute confidence in counter performance:
Example 1.2: S has a roadside stall, offering soda for sale at a
price of $1/can. S puts out a tin to collect payment and leaves
the stall unmanned. B selects a can, puts $1 in the collection tin,
and leaves with the drink.
There are obvious advantages to such a setup. B can simply take possession,
without the need for S (or S’s agent) to be present. In a sense, these are the
“smartest” contracts around; sale can occur by self-help, without the need for
any machine.
But B’s additional confidence in counter performance comes at a price
to S. S no longer has any assurance that B will perform. S must simply trust the
good intentions of any would-be customer. Accordingly, these transactions work
for low-value, low-frequency sales, but they do not give us a blueprint that works
at scale. And thus, we arrive at the impetus for secure, automated contract
performance—a way of providing mutual assurance that each party will perform.
The mechanical answer to that demand has a surprisingly long pedigree.
Hero, a first century A.D. Greek engineer and prolific inventor, documented the
first-known vending machine in his text Mechanics and Optics.73 Hero’s
machine accepted a five Drachma coin, which would push a platform down,
opening a valve and dispensing a trickle of water. The pan would continue to tilt
with the weight of the coin until it fell off, at which point a counter-weight would
push the lever back up and turn off the valve. This is an ancient precursor to the
modern snack-dispenser, and it provides a (relatively) cheap and easy
mechanism for securing the counter performance of both parties, while
protecting the money price from interference.
Modern vending machine transactions operate as follows:
Example 1.3: S owns and stocks a vending machine, in which
soda is offered for sale at a price of $1/can. B selects a can, puts
coins of the correct value in the slot, and recovers the drink from
a tray at the base.
Szabo described the vending machine as “a contract with bearer.”74 Yet, it is
worth emphasizing here, because it will be crucial later,75 that the contractual
process occurs in the background to the mechanical operation. The vending
machine owner (S) makes an open offer in the form “If you pay me $1, I will
give you a can of soda of the kind that you have selected.” By putting coins into
73
74
75

See generally VICTOR J. KATZ, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS: AN INTRODUCTION (1998).
Smart Contracts, supra note 7.
See infra Section II.A.1.
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the slot, B accepts that offer and imposes a duty on S to deliver the drink. That
obligation is executed by the vending machine. In short, the vending machine is
not itself a contract; it executes a contract. From the perspective of the law,
therefore, there is very little difference between a vending machine and a
roadside stall. The practical difference between them lies in the mode of
performance—by self-help on one hand, by mechanized delivery on the other.
Thus, the vending machine does what the roadside stall cannot: it
provides confidence in counter performance for both parties. Each can simply
trust the machine to deliver possession of the goods and price respectively.
3. Buying and Selling Digital Assets
We have already seen that the transfer of physical possession is usually
enough to guarantee security of receipt. That simple feature facilitates a system
of peer-to-peer commerce. Parties are content to deal directly with one another,
without recourse to any other authority. But we cannot rely upon that mechanism
in the digital realm. The reason for this is not (or not merely) that digital assets
are intangible;76 rather, it is that they are “non-rivalrous.”77 Unlike the transfer
of a coin or can, the transfer of digital information (“data”) does not entail
relinquishing the object of transfer. Instead, it causes the information to be
replicated. After the transfer, the transferor and the transferee will each hold a
copy of the data. So, if we want data to behave like a real-world asset transfer—
which is to say, if we want it to be possible to associate data with only one
person—we have an additional obstacle. Take the following example:
Example 1.4: S owns and runs a convenience store. Soda is
advertised for sale at a price of $1. B selects a can and offers to
pay with a digital coin.
In order to give S confidence that, post-sale, the world will behave as if S is the
person properly entitled to spend that digital coin, we need some way of making
sure that B will not subsequently draw upon the coin’s purchasing power. This
is usually termed “double-spending,”78 but the problem is not unique to money

76
Note that digital data does have a physical presence. Rolf Landauer, Information Is Physical,
44 PHYSICS TODAY 23, 23 (1991) (“Computation is inevitably done with real physical degrees of
freedom, obeying the laws of physics, and using parts available in our actual physical universe.”).
See generally JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A HISTORY, A THEORY, A FLOOD (2012). A legal
interest, being a relationship between individuals to which the law affords a particular status, is
intangible. A series of “0” or “1” states on computer storage components, held locally or provided
by a server, is not: each memory cell is set to a high or low voltage level to reflect a “bit” of binary
information. Id. at 204–33.
77
See generally SARAH GREEN & JOHN RANDALL, THE TORT OF CONVERSION (2009).
78
Nakamoto, supra note 10. See, e.g., THE RULE OF CODE, supra note 8, at 19–20; David
Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, 267 SCI. AM. 96, 97 (Aug. 1992); Green, supra note 11, at
236.
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or to the digital realm. It exists on the same scale as the problem of “security of
receipt” that we met in relation to Example 1.1 above.79 The problem is not
created, but rather exacerbated, by data.
The simplest solution to this problem is a centralized one, and it is one
that we have already met.80 We rely upon mutually-trusted third parties to tell us
who owns what: registrars record entitlement to houses and to digital assets like
domain names; for digital money transfers, we rely upon banks to execute
payments and to provide information to their customers about account balances.
So, digital assets create an acute problem of confidence in security of
receipt; that problem is usually solved by mutually-trusted third parties.
4. Automating Digital Asset Sales
Szabo’s goal was to extend the idea of automatic asset sales to the digital
realm—to “embed contracts in all sorts of property that is valuable and
controlled by digital means.”81 The first step towards that goal is simply to
automate digital asset sales. This requires some way of manifesting assets
digitally and programming computers to respond to pre-defined trigger events.82
These sorts of programs existed prior to 1994 and are now commonplace:
Example 2.1: S advertises e-books for sale online. A Brief
History of Time83 is offered for sale at a price of $10. B clicks
“buy,” effects payment, and downloads the book to an e-reader.
Access is granted automatically. Once paid for, the book can be downloaded
without any further action on the part of S.
There are, however, two important differences between this sort of
digital automation and our Example 1.3:
Example 1.3: S owns and stocks a vending machine, in which
soda is offered for sale at a price of $1/can. B selects a can, puts
coins of the correct value in the slot, and recovers the drink from
a tray at the base.
In Example 1.3, S cedes operational control to the vending machine. Because of
this, B (assuming familiarity with the mechanism of sale) does not need to know
or trust S. B simply trusts the machine. In Example 2.1, by contrast, S retains

79

Supra Section II.A.1.

80

Id.
Smart Contracts, supra note 7.

81

82
See generally Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 639 (2012)
(A “data-oriented contract” is a contract “in which the parties have expressed one or more terms
or conditions of their agreement in a manner designed to be processable by a computer system.”).
83
STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES
(1988).
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operational control. And whenever S retains control, B must trust S that the
program will operate as advertised.
Second, the sale in Example 1.3 can be executed without the help of any
intermediary at the point of purchase.84 Cash is a particularly clever technology,
which permits peer-to-peer payment by physical delivery. Coins represent a
credit balance that the holder can transfer by way of discharge of a payment
obligation.85 And, once triggered by payment, the machine will deliver the drink
automatically. By contrast, B in Example 2.1 must rely upon a bank to effect
payment,86 and S must rely upon another bank to receive it.87
Szabo proposed a way of dealing with these differences. By asking the
reader to imagine the digital manifestation of a vending machine,88 Szabo
sketched out his vision of peer-to-peer transactions between untrusted actors in
public networks. In the course of his 199489 and 199790 blog posts, Szabo
identified some of the economic and technological devices that he thought would
help to build his virtual vending machine.91 Yet, it was not until 2008 that these
parts were assembled in such a fashion as to realize Szabo’s vision in toto.92
B. Blind Consensus Protocols: Understanding the Political Model and
Practical Ramifications of Blockchain Technology
It is widely understood that Szabo’s “virtual vending machine” was
made possible by the technology, called “blockchain technology,” that underpins
the cryptocurrency “Bitcoin.”93 The term “smart contract” is now rarely used
without a reference to blockchain technology.94 There is, however, a great deal

84

Prior to the point of purchase, sellers will usually rely on third parties to stock the machine.
See generally Felix Martin, Bitcoin Is Pointless as a Currency but It Could Change the
World Anyway, WIRED (Mar. 31, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoincurrency-martin/.
85

86
87
88
89
90
91

And usually other intermediate payment providers as well.
Or they may share the same bank.
Smart Contracts, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
Including digital signatures, public key encryption, and hierarchical transaction logs. Id.

92

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 4.
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 324 (“The development that made Szabo’s vision of
smart contracts more than a mere curiosity was Bitcoin.”).
94
Smart contracts are described as “a piece of software code, implemented on a Blockchain
platform, which ensures self-performance and the autonomous nature of its terms, triggered by
conditions defined in advance and applied to Blockchain-titled assets.” Savelyev, supra note 11,
at 127; see also Michèle Finck, supra note 11, at 2 (“Smart contracts can be defined as selfexecuting code that automatically processes its inputs when it is triggered.”); Usha R. Rodrigues,
Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 680 (2019) (“[B]lockchain technology permits
93
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of confusion about precisely how these two innovations relate to one another.
For some, blockchain technology facilitates the manifestation of contractual
agreement.95 For others, it relates to the digital automation of contractual
performance.96 Yet, we saw above that it was possible both to manifest and
automate contracts digitally prior to the advent of Bitcoin. What, then, does
blockchain technology add? The answer, we will see, lies in the ability to
generate enough confidence in counter performance and security of receipt to
enable parties to transact on a peer-to-peer basis in the digital realm, just as they
do offline.
We have seen that the anchor of possession is a powerful one. It allows
parties to transact directly with one another, without resorting to third parties.
We have also seen that data does not exhibit the traits necessary for such
exclusive control; data is replicated, not relinquished, in the process of transfer.
So far, therefore, parties contracting in the digital sphere have used
intermediaries (banks, domain-name registrars, media companies, etc.) to tell
them who owns what. Bitcoin facilitates the transfer of digital assets without
these intermediaries. Its innovation is as much political as technological: Bitcoin
encourages lots of actors to come to a consensus about the answer to the
ownership question. In this way, Bitcoin allows parties to transact without using
third parties, in a similar way to the peer-to-peer sale of real-world assets.
1. Blind Consensus
The basic elements of blockchain technology can be exemplified without
recourse to the digital sphere. Imagine the following scenario:

“smart contracts” that allow coders to layer on top of currency exchanges particular conditions
under which those exchanges will occur.”).
95

See, e.g., THE RULE OF CODE, supra note 8, at 74 (“In many ways, smart contracts are no
different than today’s written agreements.”); Green, supra note 11, at 235 (“[R]ather than using
computers merely to perform pre-existing contractual agreements . . . computers can now also be
used to carry out the entire contractual process, from formation to execution. This has been made
possible by the advent of distributed ledger technology.”); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at
368 (“A smart contract is computer code representing an agreement between two or more parties”);
Mateja Durovic, How to Resolve Smart Contract Disputes – Smart Arbitration as a Solution, U.
OXFORD FAC. L. (June 1, 2018), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/06/lawand-autonomous-systems-series-how-resolve-smart-contract-disputes (“[S]mart contracts require
redress mechanisms that enable resolution of disputes without the need to leave the digital
world.”); Smart Contracts, supra note 7 (“The basic idea behind smart contracts is that many kinds
of contractual clauses (such as collateral, bonding, delineation of property rights, etc.) can be
embedded in the hardware and software we dealt with.”).
96
See, e.g., Finck, supra note 11, at 2 (Smart contracts are “one form of automated data
processing that promise to generate efficiency gains while powering new markets and ventures.”);
Smart Contracts, supra note 7 (“A smart contract is a computerized transaction protocol that
executes the terms of a contract.”).
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Scenario A: There are five prisoners—A, B, C, D and E. A is
given a cell phone, and then all the prisoners are locked in
separate rooms. Each room contains seven buttons: five
represent the prisoners; two are simply marked ✓ and . Any
time one prisoner wishes to transfer the cell phone to another,
that prisoner presses one of the identity buttons (A, B, C, D or
E). Matching buttons light up in all the other rooms, and the
other prisoners may press ✓ or , thereby voting to approve or
reject the transfer. If the would-be transferor does indeed have
the phone, and other prisoners vote to approve it, all five are
rewarded. Any other combination will see them all punished.
Let us assume that the prisoners are unrelated and have no history of dealings
prior to their imprisonment. None has any reason to consider the others
trustworthy—quite the opposite. Moreover, none can actually see who has the
cell phone at any moment in time. In this sense, they are all operating “blind.”
Nevertheless, three factors combine to give each a good reason to believe that
the other inmates will vote, as a collective, to validate a transfer that meets the
stipulations. First, each can infer the correct answer either from the original
allocation to A, or from a previous transfer. Second, the method of
communication is reliable. Finally, each is incentivized to vote honestly by the
promise of reward and the threat of punishment. We now have a template for
reaching “blind consensus”—a system for validating asset-transfers without
resorting to third parties, in circumstances that preclude the visual identification
of entitlement.
Instead of real-world assets, let us now assume a particular distribution
of digital holdings. And instead of a single asset-transfer, let us assume that each
of our participants can make transfers and receive assets, so that we need a more
sophisticated mechanism for keeping track of transactions:
Scenario B: Anyone can buy, hold and transfer JailCoins. All
participants in the JailCoin system have access to a
chronological record of all previous transactions. Each can run
a program that will tell them, by cross-checking that record,
whether an individual has sufficient funds to make a particular
transfer. Each also has access to an online forum. If one
participant (“A”) wishes to transfer one JailCoin to another
participant (“B”), A will indicate that intention on the forum.
Other participants can then check the record to see whether A
has sufficient funds and can vote on whether the transfer should
go ahead. If A has one JailCoin, and if they vote “yes,” the
transfer is added to the record and all participants are entered
into a lottery to win one JailCoin.
As in Scenario A above, no participant can draw any visual cue from physical
possession. But, as above, if there is a record of an earlier transaction in which
A received a particular quantity of JailCoins (and no later record of A giving
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them away), it will be possible for the participants to conclude that A has the
capacity to make the transfer.97 And as above, they are incentivized to vote for it
to go through.
In principle, this works well enough, and (we will see) it broadly reflects
the way in which the Bitcoin protocol operates. But we now face a hurdle, which
we did not face in Scenario A. In the digital world, voting power can be captured
unilaterally by making multiple identities.98 This creates a problem for a system
that relies on voting: by proliferating identities, participants are able to weight
voting power in favour of a particular outcome. Prior to Bitcoin, this was a
substantial obstacle in the way of implementing a disintermediated platform for
digital commerce.
In 2008, a writer (or group of writers) under the pen name “Satoshi
Nakamoto” brought together a variety of technological and economic
innovations to solve this problem.99 The protocol they designed, called
“Bitcoin,” disincentivized identity capture by requiring participants to commit
computing resources to the process of validating transactions. This solution is
known as “proof of work.”100 In an open network, proof of work equates identity
to processing power.101 So, the Bitcoin Blockchain operates as follows, where a
“miner’s” chance of winning the competition is roughly equal to the proportion
of the network’s computing power that they control:
Scenario C: Anyone can buy, hold and transfer bitcoins. All
participants have access to a time-stamped102 ledger of all
previous transactions (“the Blockchain”). A participant (“A”)
who wishes to transfer funds to another participant (“B”) must
announce that intention to the network. Any participant can
check the Blockchain to see whether A has capacity to do so.
New transactions cannot be verified and added to the

97

Blindness as to the asset is dealt with by a ledger.
This is called a “Sybil attack,” named after the subject of a case study of a woman diagnosed
with dissociative identity disorder. FLORA RHETA SCHREIBER, SYBIL (1973); Buterin, supra note
32. See generally Michael Nielsen, How the Bitcoin Protocol Actually Works, DATA-DRIVEN
INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/how-the-bitcoin-protocolactually-works/.
98

99

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 4.
The solution provided by proof of work is hardly elegant but has proven to be effective:
While nodes with a large amount of computational power do have
proportionately greater influence, coming up with more computational power
than the entire network combined is much harder than simulating a million
nodes. Despite the Bitcoin blockchain model’s crudeness and simplicity, it has
proven to be good enough, and would over the next five years become the
bedrock of over two hundred currencies and protocols around the world.
Buterin, supra note 32, at 4.
101
See generally Nielsen, supra note 98.
100

102

Entries are noted with their relative chronological position.
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Blockchain without the solution to a mathematical problem,
which “miners” compete to solve. Once the answer is found, A’s
transaction can be assigned to a group (“block”) of transactions
and added to the Blockchain. The miner who solves the problem
first receives one bitcoin.
In this way, parties may send and receive assets on a peer-to-peer basis, without
the need for banks and other financial intermediaries. Like the JailCoin model,
Bitcoin miners are incentivized to verify transactions by the prospect of receiving
an economic reward (₿1).
The practical robustness of Bitcoin is secured by providing a workable
solution to two related problems. The first is the need to choose between
competing instructions to transfer a particular quantity of bitcoin. If A
simultaneously instructs the network to transfer one bitcoin (called an unspent
output, or “UTXO”) to B, and the same UTXO to another wallet that A controls,
only one transaction will be added to the Blockchain. Whichever transaction is
confirmed first by the miners will be processed. Thus, Bitcoin is often described
as a “first to file” system.103
The second problem is the need to thwart any attempt to reverse a
transaction that has already been confirmed. Let us suppose that A instructs the
network to transfer a particular UTXO to B and then seeks to reclaim it.104 That
transaction will be rejected by the miners, who can check the ledger and see that
that output has already been spent. In order for A’s ploy to succeed, A will need
to redo the mathematical problem that led to confirmation of the first transaction.
This results in a “fork,”105 producing two competing chains. Legitimate miners
will continue to work on the original chain, leaving A’s chain redundant. In order
to persuade the rest of the miners to work on A’s chain, A will need more
computational power than the rest of the network combined.106 For so long as
fifty percent of that power lies with honest miners, A’s attack will fail.
These mechanisms immunize Bitcoin from attacks that would
undermine the integrity of the platform as a whole. A person who receives
bitcoin, just like a person who receives a coin or can of soda, can be reasonably
confident that no one will come along and assert a superior claim. Thus, Bitcoin
offers a practically-robust mechanism for transferring digital assets on a peer-topeer basis—without banks and other financial intermediaries.

103

See Buterin, supra note 32, at 1.

104

To enable A to engage in what we have called “double-spending.”
See Buterin, supra note 32, at 8.

105
106

Id.
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2. Crypto-Assets and Block-Chains
Above, I indicated that “bitcoins” are described as unspent transactional
outputs (“UTXO”).107 This is not a linguistic quirk; rather, it describes a
substantive quality of the relationship between a user and “their” bitcoin. When
a particular wallet holds “₿1,” that means that the wallet contains one or more
UTXO totalling ₿1.108 An instruction to transfer “a bitcoin” is an instruction to
send one or more UTXO’s worth ₿1 (or more, returning change). No single
“bitcoin” has a constant identity. Each is simply made up from the history of
transactions by which one or more UTXO’s have come to be associated with a
particular wallet address.109 So, each bitcoin is unique, but none retains precisely
the same form before and after a wallet transaction.110
The strength of the association with money makes it important to
emphasize that the Blockchain is a record of who controls how much of a
particular thing, rather than a record of the amount owed. Unlike other money
media, Bitcoin it is not a credit network.111 That is what makes it so easy to make
the intellectual and practical leap from Bitcoin to protocols that host all sorts of
other assets.112

107
Not all blind consensus protocols are of this form: Ethereum relies on a “virtual computer”
model. See generally Ethereum Homestead Documentation, supra note 34.
108
Knut Karnapp, What Do You Legally Own with Bitcoin?, MEDIUM (Nov. 23, 2018),
https://medium.com/coinmonks/what-do-you-legally-own-with-bitcoin-97b083ed6a04
(describing the “power of disposition” that a private key offers over UTXO, and equating this to
(a form of) legal ownership).
109
See Nielsen, supra note 98 (“[I]n Bitcoin there’s not really any separate, persistent ‘coins’
at all, just a long series of transactions in the block chain.”).
110
Some of the best analogies, therefore, are with specific quantifies of oil or water: bitcoins
are scarce, rivalrous, and fungible things, the physical constitution of which can change over time.
The private key offers the control that one has over a particular UTXO. See Preston Byrne, What
Do You Legally “Own” with Bitcoin? A Short Introduction to Krypto-Property, PRESTON BYRNE
(Nov. 23, 2018), https://prestonbyrne.com/2018/11/23/krypto_property/.
111
For money as a credit network, see A. Mitchell Inness, The Credit Theory of Money, 31
BANKING L.J. 151, 151 (1914); A. Mitchell Inness, What Is Money?, 30 BANKING L.J. 377, 377
(1913). This raises other questions about the nature of Bitcoin as a monetary asset, which I cannot
consider in depth here. One point is worth making: insofar as the question is a functional one, if
Bitcoin can in fact be used to discharge the payment liabilities through which we purchase things,
it discharges one function of money (albeit, what might be described as a “private” money). It may,
of course, turn out that those who hold and transfer Bitcoin do so with a different objective in
mind; the absence of a monetary policy makes it difficult to maintain the sort of constant value
that is necessary for the fluid circulation of an asset.

Bitcoins themselves can be “colored,” by means of software that allocates information
about another (real-world or digital) asset to transaction metadata. UK GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER,
supra note 58, at 61. Blockchain technology provides a method that
opens up the possibility of money with more than just value: it could carry
attributes such as necessary purpose, expiry date, or location of allowed use.
For example, money may have restrictions on the kind of goods and service it
112
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Two semantic points bear emphasis at the conclusion to this section.
First, the term “blockchain” has come to mean a variety of things, not all of
which reflect the features of protocols under consideration here. “Block-”
literally describes the grouping of transactions, which is necessary to slow the
rate of verification enough for participants to be able to see which chain should
command their computational resources.113 It is not necessary in closed systems
that do not rely upon proof of work.114 I have chosen the label “blind consensus
protocol,” which serves our purposes better. It emphasises the ability to generate
agreement about whether a participant has the resources to execute a particular
transfer, without the visible anchor of physical possession. The set of rules that
implements that solution is a “blind consensus protocol.” The transactional
environment that implements those rules is a “blind consensus platform.”
Second, I have used the term “disintermediated.” The term is prolific,
but it is not actually entirely accurate. Bitcoin’s process of transaction
verification is distributed (anyone may in theory take part), but intermediated:
miners are intermediaries.115 The ideological notion of absolute
disintermediation stems from the idea that network users are also miners, so that
there are not two distinct groups of actors—those who use the system in a fashion
akin to ordinary consumers, and those who contribute to the system by verifying
transactions. In practice, there are two distinct groups, with very little cross-over.
Nevertheless, I will adopt the term “disintermediated” here, as it reflects the
important idea that traditional intermediaries are absent from the process.
Above, I identified two features that set the vending machine apart from
any ordinary automated asset-delivery program; first, confidence in counter
performance does not depend upon the seller’s reputation; second, sale can be
executed without the help of any intermediary at the point of purchase. For a
small class of assets, at least, Bitcoin provides a way of eliminating the second
difference. It allows parties to transact on a peer-to-peer basis, without the
infrastructure of traditional intermediaries.

can be used to purchase . . . ; or someone renting a flat through Airbnb may
have their electronic access key revoked if they fail to pay on time, or if their
contract has expired.
Id. at 57. We will see in what follows that there now exists a platform that permits more nuanced
structures of asset control and delivery, facilitating a richer system for transacting in public
networks.
113
See Mike Hearn, Corda: A Distributed Ledger, CORDA, Nov. 29, 2016, at 30
https://docs.corda.net/_static/corda-technical-whitepaper.pdf.
114
Id.
115
This point is rarely made, but it is important: it raises questions about whether it is better to
place trust in the operation of a variety of intermediaries (as well as the code architects), rather
than one intermediary. These are not trust-free transactions. See Bruce Schneier, There’s No Good
Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchain-technology/.
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C. Smart Contracts: Negatively-Automated Asset Sales and the Digital
Environment
We have seen that contracts could be manifested and executed
automatically prior to the creation of Bitcoin.116 The contribution of blind
consensus protocols is to facilitate a specific type of digital transaction, which is
the transfer of an asset on a peer-to-peer basis—without trusting any one actor
(counterparty or intermediary).
This provides part but not all of the machinery that we need to get to our
virtual vending machine. Let us return to Example 1.3:
Example 1.3: S owns and stocks a vending machine, in which
soda is offered for sale at a price of $1/can. B selects a can, puts
coins of the correct value in the slot, and recovers the drink from
a tray at the base.
The vending machine automates one side of a bilateral exchange. And it does so
in circumstances that place performance outside S’s control. Contractual
performance is negatively automated. A vending machine not only self-operates;
it also does so in a way that precludes interference with contractual performance.
What we need to complete the analogy between vending machine sales and
digital asset sales is some similar mechanism for combining automation with
disintermediation so as to remove operational control from the seller. The
outcome of that combination, we will see, is a “smart contract.”
1. Putting It All Together: Negatively-Automated Asset Sales
The next step in our progression, from physical asset sales to negativelyautomated digital asset sales, is to design a program that interacts with a blind
consensus platform:
Example 2.2: An online newspaper accepts payment in Bitcoin.
If a reader (“B”) pays ₿0.01, B is automatically granted a onemonth subscription.
The contract is positively automated. Once triggered, the program executes the
contract without any further human input. But that program remains within the
control of the newspaper. It is possible for the newspaper to withdraw or
otherwise interrupt the reader’s access. And this is the crucial point, which
distinguishes positive from negative automation. The vending machine not only
delivers the asset without operational input; that transaction cannot easily be
frustrated by any single actor, whether S or some third party. So, in order to make
Example 2.2 look more like Example 1.3, we need a way of taking the
software—the rails of the transaction—outside of S’s control.

116

Supra Section II.A.4.
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Bitcoin facilitates a basic version of this sort of enterprise. UTXO can
be controlled by script (a particular type of code that instructs a program) that
requires pre-designated data to unlock that output.117 That script then cannot be
altered by any single actor. However, its transactional ecology is limited. There
are very few ways in which individuals can set up automated transactions within
Bitcoin’s infrastructure.
The Ethereum platform, launched in 2015,118 was devised to remove
these limitations. Termed a “programmable blockchain,”119 the purpose of
Ethereum was to provide a more complete and complex language for building
programs that could interact with digital assets on blind consensus platforms. 120
The Ethereum Foundation describes the project as “a decentralized platform that
runs smart contracts: applications that run exactly as programmed without any
possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party interference.”121
Ethereum allows parties to design their contract such that no single entity
controls or can alter performance. Take the following example, where
“cryptokitty” describes a particular on-platform asset (a collectible, digital cat)122
and “Ξ” denominates Ether, which is the currency of Ethereum:
Example 3.1: S offers a cryptokitty (“Kitty 572634”) for sale for
Ξ1. S also uploads script that, when triggered by payment, will
cause the cryptokitty to be transferred to the buyer. B transfers
Ξ1 and receives Kitty 572634.
In this example, the whole transaction—payment of the price and transfer of the
asset—is governed by the blind consensus platform. The script cannot be altered
once it has been uploaded to the platform, and S cannot prevent the transfer from
occurring when B meets the stipulated condition.
We are now in a position to return to those features which set the vending
machine apart from any ordinary automated asset-delivery program: B does not
need to trust S, and sale can be executed entirely without the help of any
intermediary at the point of purchase. Bitcoin removed the second difference
(intermediation). By removing both differences within the same transactional
environment, Ethereum completes the vending machine analogy. S and B may
set up an asset-transfer that is positively automated (requires no operational input
beyond the trigger event) and negatively automated (once uploaded, precludes

117

See generally Buterin, supra note 32.

118

Id.
See generally What Is Ethereum?, ETHEREUM HOMESTEAD, https://ethereumhomestead.readthedocs.io/en/latest/introduction/what-is-ethereum.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
120
See generally Buterin, supra note 32.
119

121
What Is Ethereum?, CONSENSYS, https://consensys.net/knowledge-base/about-ethereumeth/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
122

See CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
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further input). S and B may now transact with mutual confidence in counter
performance. They need not trust one another or any third party; they can simply
trust the Ethereum platform. This, finally, is Szabo’s virtual vending machine.
2. Digital Contracts for Public Networks
The vending machine is a useful analogy for the way in which goods
move within public networks between unknown and untrusted actors. A defined
range of goods can be offered for sale in a visible, automated way.123 But Szabo
imagined a rich contractual environment, in which parties could manipulate the
conditions for asset-transfer in a multitude of different ways.124 Ethereum allows
parties to do just that. Its programming language is sufficiently flexible to permit
the creation of a variety of different structures for owning and transferring assets,
which can be designed in such a way as to govern those assets over extended
periods of time. The “decentralized autonomous organisation” (“DAO”)125 is
now a well-known (though much-maligned) vehicle for facilitating long-term
financial decision-making:
Example 4: A set of interoperable scripts control digital wallets
to which platform users may commit funds during a designated
window. Those scripts are designed to direct a series of
investments over a fixed period of time, paying any investment
return to users in proportion to funds committed.
Moreover, scripts can be designed to interact with “oracles,”126 which feed them
information about the real-world:
Example 5: A and B bet on a horse race. If Piccolo Star wins the
Kentucky Derby, Ξ1 will be deducted from B’s wallet and sent
to A’s wallet. If Piccolo Star does not win, Ξ0.1 will be deducted

Buterin defines a smart contract as “a mechanism involving digital assets and two or more
parties, where some or all of the parties put assets in, and assets are automatically redistributed
among those parties according to a formula based on certain data that is not known at the time the
contract is initiated.” Vitalik Buterin, DAOs, DACs, DAs, and More: An Incomplete Terminology
Guide, ETHEREUM BLOG (May 6, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-andmore-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/.
124
Smart Contracts, supra note 7 (“Smart contracts combine protocols, users interfaces, and
promises expressed via those interfaces, to formalize and secure relationships over public
networks. This gives us new ways to formalize the digital relationships which are far more
functional than their inanimate paper-based ancestors.”).
125
Wright and De Filippi describe this vehicle as follows: “These organizations can reimplement certain aspects of traditional corporate governance using software, enabling parties to
obtain the benefits of formal corporate structures, while at the same time maintaining the flexibility
and scale of informal online groups.” Wright & De Fillipi, supra note 11, at 3; see also Buterin,
supra note 32.
123

126

See, e.g., THE RULE OF CODE, supra note 8, at 75.
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from A’s wallet and sent to B’s wallet. An oracle feeds the
information “Piccolo Star wins the Kentucky Derby,” and Ξ1 is
sent from A to B.
In this way, Ethereum provides a platform for allowing parties to memorialize
(suitable parts of) relatively sophisticated, interdependent contractual steps in
code, rendering performance immune from outside interference.
3. Three Smart Contracts; One Core Case
Equipped with a better understanding of Szabo’s objective and the tools
with which that objective has been realized, we are now able to turn to the
definitional task. Here, two crucial distinctions emerge from the literature. The
first and most important is a distinction between code and contract. The second
is a distinction between positive and negative automation.
For some, the term “smart contract” describes a legal contract that is
implemented by a particular type of code.127 For others, it describes a type of
code that, when uploaded to a blind consensus platform, precludes operational
interference.128 Indeed, some in the latter camp now lament Szabo’s use of the
term “smart contract,” preferring “persistent script.”129 The perpetuation of this
ambiguity is hardly surprising: “contract” carries a great deal of linguistic
baggage.130 Yet, if it is not possible to find consensus in the literature that has
been produced over the last two decades, it is possible to deduce Szabo’s
intended meaning. In those two seminal blog posts,131 Szabo described a

127
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. CLACK ET AL., SMART CONTRACT TEMPLATES: FOUNDATIONS,
DESIGN LANDSCAPE AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 2 (last revised Mar. 15, 2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771.pdf. The term “smart contract” is used primarily by those who
engage in the Ethereum community to describe a type of code. See generally What Is a Contract?,
ETHERIUM HOMESTEAD,
https://ethereum-homestead.readthedocs.io/en/latest/contracts-andtransactions/contracts.html#writing-a-contract (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“A contract is a
collection of code (its functions) and data (its state) that resides at a specific address on the
Ethereum blockchain.”). In what follows, I show that Szabo uses the term to describe a narrower
and more specific use of script, to codify contractual agreements.
128
See, e.g., Jaccard, supra note 11, § 2 (“[W]e may roughly describe a smart contract as a
computer code enforcing rules and consequences.”). I assume here, arguendo, that there is a
distinction to be drawn between code and contract; I address this distinction in Part III.
129
Vitalik Buterin used this term in a tweet. He said, “To be clear, at this point I quite regret
adopting the term ‘smart contracts.’ I should have called them something more boring and
technical, perhaps something like ‘persistent scripts.’” Vitalik Buterin (@VitalikButerin),
TWITTER
(Oct.
13,
2018,
10:21
AM),
https://twitter.com/vitalikbuterin/status/1051160932699770882?lang=en.
130
See generally Alvaro Gonzalez Rivas et al., Smart Contracts and Their Identity Crisis, in
THIRTY NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS, SAN FRANCISCO 2018
(Feb. 2, 2019).
131

See Smart Contracts, supra note 7.
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particular mechanism for enforcing legal contracts. A smart contract, he said, is
a “computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract.”132
Thus, for Szabo, a smart contract was a type of code, not a legal contract.
Szabo’s focus was not, however, as broad as the label “persistent script”
implies. For Szabo, a “smart contract” did not refer to any implementation of
persistent script, but rather the mechanism by which a legal agreement could be
negatively automated.133 So, if persistent script describes negatively-automated
code (which may or may not execute a legal contract), and legal contracts may
be negatively automated through mechanisms other than persistent script,134
Szabo’s “smart contract” describes the overlap between these two devices. A
“smart contract” is code that negatively automates contractual performance:
Figure 1:

To avoid categorical confusion, I will refer to persistent script and
negatively automated legal contracts directly by those names.
The second distinction concerns the type of automation involved in a
particular transaction. We have seen that Szabo’s objective was to come up with
a system in which contracts could be set up (like the vending machine) to selfoperate in a way that precludes intervention (what I have called negative
automation throughout this article). We saw in the first part of this article that
these negatively automated contracts are supported by blind consensus protocols.
Yet, for some, the term “smart contract” is broader than this core case, including
so-called “distributed”135 systems over which a small number of parties retain

132

Id. (emphasis added).

133

Id. (“The basic idea behind smart contracts is that many kinds of contractual clauses . . . can
be embedded in the hardware and software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach of
contract [prohibitively] expens[ive] . . . for the breacher.”).
134
Including, of course, the vending machine.
135
See, e.g., Jaccard, supra note 11 (“[S]oftware, which computer code binds two, or a
multitude, of parties in view of the execution of predefined effects, and that is stored on a
distributed ledger.”).
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operational control.136 It bears emphasis, here, that there is an important
difference between the two ways in which a system may be “distributed”: first,
all elements of transaction verification and recording are (theoretically) open to
anyone;137 second, some elements of transaction verification and recording are
open to a limited number of persons.138 The models are described, respectively,
as “permissionlesss” and “permissioned.”139 Permissioned systems might
usefully be illustrated by way of a Google Doc: a document can be set up so that
a variety of persons may view or edit, while the infrastructure that allows the
document to be created is maintained by a single company.
Unless the parties have the specific aim of setting up a transaction that
ousts the operational control of either party (or any third party), there are
considerable commercial advantages to a permissioned system. Take the
following example:
Example 6: Two local authorities set up an interest-rate swaps
agreement, which is intended to operate over a period of 20
years. They automate payments at designated intervals by way
of interoperable scripts, with a user interface that allows them to
see the state of their contract in real-time.
Let us suppose that in year three of the contract, the relevant government makes
it illegal for local authorities to carry on agreements of this form. In these
circumstances, it would be absolutely crucial for the parties to be able to halt
performance. And there are, of course, many subtler alterations that
organizations may wish to make in response to developments in their economic
or legal environment. For these sorts of arrangements, negative automation is
neither necessary nor desirable. And where negative automation is not the goal,
a blind consensus protocol is not the right tool.
So, the second distinction is between positively-automated contracts
(supported by permissioned protocols) and Szabo’s negatively-automated
contracts (supported by blind consensus protocols). These two distinctions can
be represented as four categories. The first two are types of code and can be

136
Such a system may either use a centralized administering authority, or a smaller group of
governing parties. See, e.g., R3 & NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, CAN SMART CONTRACTS BE LEGALLY
BINDING CONTRACTS?—AN R3 AND NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT WHITE PAPER,
https://lawsdocbox.com/Legal_Issues/72287181-Can-smart-contracts-be-legally-bindingcontracts-an-r3-and-norton-rose-fulbright-white-paper.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
137
Like Bitcoin.
138
R3’s “Corda” is such a model. See MIKE HEARN, CORDA: A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER (Nov. 29,
2016), https://docs.corda.net/_static/corda-technical-whitepaper.pdf.
139
There may be a benefit to a variety of permissioned or permission-less models in adopting
a chronological record of transactions; there will be a benefit to only some such models in grouping
that record by mutually-referential blocks. See generally id.
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called “plastic script”140 and “persistent script.” Plastic script is (as the term is
used here) any code that instructs a program to perform automatically, which
remains in the control of one or more individuals. Persistent script is (as the term
is used here) any code that instructs a program to perform automatically, which
does not remain in the control of any individual(s). Plastic script is not given the
label “smart contract”; persistent script is. The third and fourth categories are
types of legal contract. All or part of a “positively-automated contract” is
executed by a self-operating program; performance of a “negatively-automated
contract” is prescribed by persistent script. Thus, there are four categories, three
of which have attracted the label “smart contract”:
Figure 2:

Plastic script

Positively-automated
contract

Persistent script

Negatively-automated
contract

= smart contract

While I have divided these categories into distinct boxes, the reality is
not so tidy. A contract might be “hybrid” in that parts of it may be negatively—
and some parts positively—automated. Script may prescribe performance of a
legal contract or some other arrangement. Moreover, there may be degrees of
each form of automation; it may be made more or less difficult to interfere with
performance, and a contract may require a limited form of ongoing input to
execute.
So, if the “core case” of a smart contract describes the computer
mechanism (persistent script) by which a contractual agreement is negatively
automated, there exists a range of systems that admit greater or lesser degrees of
operational interference. Our primary focus in Part III will be upon the merits of
using persistent script to implement the sort of arrangement that Szabo
envisaged—a negatively-automated legal contract.

140

A type of script that may be shaped and altered by its creator, before and throughout
contractual performance.
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III. JUSTIFYING SMART CONTRACTS
We are now in a position to consider the benefits and disadvantages of
using persistent script to perform contracts. The analysis in this part will revolve
around three discrete but related claims that pervade the literature on smart
contracting. Two claims are taxonomic. The first goes to the relationship
between smart contracts and legal contracts, and it denies the distinction between
code and contract that I drew at the end of Part II. The claim is that persistent
script is a legal contract.141 The second goes to the relationship between smart
contracts and the institutional law of contract. This claim is that, by ousting legal
oversight,142 smart contracts stand in an “orthogonal” relationship to the law of
contract.143 The third, substantive, claim cuts to the heart of the normative
question. The claim is that this competing transactional framework maximizes
individual sovereignty.144 I reject each claim in what follows.
A. Smart Contracts and Legal Contracts
Werbach and Cornell, whose analysis of smart contracts is one of the
most nuanced and extensive, argue that persistent script (though just a “chunk of
code”)145 is nevertheless a legal contract.146 For these authors, it is not

141

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 341–42 (The authors characterize smart contracts as a
“chunk of code,” but conclude that “smart contracts are, at the conceptual level, still contracts.
Though they might not constitute promises per se, smart contracts are voluntary mechanisms that
purport to alter the rights and duties of the parties.”).
142
Id. at 339 (“The central feature of a smart contract—what supposedly makes them smart—
is that legal enforcement will not be necessary, or even possible.” (emphasis added)).
143
Id. at 363.
144
The idea is that these features—code as contract, and smart contract as institutional
competitor—combine to make consumers better off.
Ultimately, what makes smart contracts unique is that they grant contracting
parties new tools to reduce monitoring costs and the potential for opportunistic
behavior . . . . By decreasing the risk of opportunistic behavior, smart contracts
open up new avenues for commercial relationships, potentially facilitating an
increasing range of economic activities . . . . [S]mart contracts also provide
comparable advantages when it comes to clarity, precision, and modularity.
THE RULE OF CODE, supra note 8, at 80–81.
145
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 340–41 (“Do smart contracts involve promises or
obligations? In a significant sense, ‘no.’ The smart contract sets in motion machinery that the
parties cannot subsequently prevent. The smart contract is not fulfilled by some further action of a
contracting party, but rather by the completion of this mechanical process.”).
146
Id. at 341–42. In part because of the terminological difficulties to which I alluded above,
opinions have been widely split on the question of whether a “smart contract” always, sometimes,
or never constitutes a legal contract. Others take the view that only some such arrangements will
constitute legal contracts. Green, supra note 11, at 234 (“There is no question, however, that a
subset of those transactions will conform to the legal requirements of an enforceable
contract . . . .”).
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appropriate to draw the kind of distinction between persistent script and
negatively-automated legal contract that I drew at the end of Part II. Instead, their
table looks something like this:
Figure 3:
Plastic script

Positively-automated
contract

Persistent script as negatively-automated contract

= smart contract
The argument behind their conclusion may be synthesized as follows.
First, Werbach and Cornell define a contract as a “promise or an agreement that
is legally enforceable.”147 To the question of what counts as a legally-enforceable
agreement, their answer is anything that is “meant to alter concretely the
normative relation between the parties.”148 This includes documents that “alter
rights presently” such as a deed of conveyance.149 Turning to the question of
whether persistent script meets those requirements, they say:
There can be little doubt that smart contracts purport to alter the
rights of the parties. The smart contract can explain, normatively
as well as descriptively, why the Bitcoin belongs to one party and
not the other. It constitutes an agreement between the parties, and
not an idle one. That, we believe, is the essence of a contract.150
Thus, they conclude, “smart contracts are contracts.”151

147
148

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 338.
Id.

149

Id. at 341 (“A deal may still count as a contract even though it leaves nothing open to be
done or performed. A conveyance, for example, is a contract that alters rights presently, and does
not involve any further, open promises.”).
150
Id. at 342.
151

[S]mart contracts are contracts. They are agreements to shift legal rights and
responsibilities, no less than an agreement between two parties physically
exchanging goods for payment over a counter. Their status as contracts might
be obscured by the fact that the parties intend litigation to be impossible, may
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To focus analysis, let us summarize premises and conclusion as follows:
P1: A contract is a legally-enforceable agreement
P2: An agreement is intended to alter the parties’ rights and
duties
P3: A smart contract is intended to alter the parties’ rights and
duties
 A smart contract is a contract
I argue at the outset to this part that P2 involves a crucial misstep. For the
purposes of the law of contract, an agreement is intended to affect the parties’
rights and duties in a specific way, which relates to the promised performance. I
argue that persistent script, which does not encode these sorts of promissory
obligations, is not a legal contract. Rather, by directing the performance of a
contract, persistent script may have three kinds of impact on legal rights and
duties. First, it may extinguish the promissory rights and duties of which the
contract is constituted. Second, it may bring about a transfer of title, thereby
altering the rights and duties entailed by ownership. Finally, it may trigger legal
remedies where the conditions for contract formation are defective.
1. What Is a Contract?
Most definitions of “contract” focus on agreement.152 A contract is “an
agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognized by law.”153
Agreement is the factor “which distinguishes contractual from other legal
obligations.”154 Much of the definitional burden is thereby shifted: if a contract
is an agreement that has a particular legal effect, what is an agreement?155 The
Oxford English Dictionary defines agreement as the act of coming to a “mutual

not make any promise, and may be expressed only in code. We suggest that
these details do not alter the fact that smart contracts are, indeed, contracts . . . .
See id. at 343.
152
See, e.g., Krasley v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. Rptr. 629, 633 (Ct. App. 1980) (“The essence
of a contract is the meeting of minds on the essential features of the agreement.”). Note that not all
definitions share this emphasis. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). Here, the
emphasis is on the binding nature of a promise, which is intended to encompass the unilaterality
of deeds.
153
EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT §1–001 (13th ed. 2011).
154

Id.
There are, of course, all sorts of agreements that never become promises, and all sorts of
promises that occur without the law. The law exists at the fringes of consensual arrangements, to
support a specific category of voluntary arrangement. Moreover, promises are not the central
instance of voluntary obligations: two trusting parties will be content to operate wholly without
exchanging promises. See Joseph Raz, Promises and Morality in Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 930–
31 (1982) (reviewing P. S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)).
155
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understanding,” or (understood as a legal term) “[a]n arrangement . . . made
between two or more parties and agreed by mutual consent.”156 MerriamWebster defines agreement as “harmony of opinion, action, or character.”157
Each such definition contains an emphasis upon mutuality: an “agreement” must
have some sort of meeting of the minds. So, an agreement is something that
occurs between two or more parties, and it involves an act of mutual consent.158
There are, however, some further steps that we must make to understand
the notion of a contractual agreement. There are two key differences between
the way in which agreement is used outside of contract law (whether in the lay
or legal sense) and the way in which agreement is used within contract law. First,
the former may include statements about the past and present that carry no
implication for the future: A and B may agree that “World War I began on July
28, 1914.” Or, to take a legal example, A and B might agree upon the location of
their mutual property boundary. These are agreements, but they are not
contracts.159 Contractual agreements, by contrast, always refer to some future
performance, yet to be rendered:
Example 7: A and B agree that A will write and deliver a
manuscript about World War II by 5th July 2022; B will pay A
$1,000 in advance, $1,000 on receipt of the completed
manuscript.
In this example, each party promises to perform a particular act—A to write and
deliver the manuscript, B to pay A $1,000 now and $1,000 upon timely delivery.
So, a contract may involve an exchange of promises, or it may involve a
conditional unilateral promise, but it always specifies some future performance.
Secondly, that agreement must be seriously meant. Werbach and Cornell
put this as the claim that a contractual agreement includes anything that is “meant
to alter concretely the normative relation between the parties.”160 It bears
emphasis, however, that the category of contractual agreement does not include

156

Agreement,
OXFORD
ENG.
DICTIONARY,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/4159?redirectedFrom=agreement#eid (last visited Oct. 17,
2019). For this definition, the focus is upon the way in which parties interact.
157
For this definition, the focus is upon the outcome of the parties’ interaction. See Agreement,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/agreement?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
158
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 66 (2014) (“What is the difference between agreement and the notions of consent or
assent? Agreement seems to imply more of a two-sided process (the idea of two parties coming to
an agreement, the idea of discussion or negotiation, what contracts scholars tend to call ‘dickered
terms’). Consent seems to imply instead a one-sided process . . . .”).
159
Of course, the promise to forbear from suing in respect to some dispute concerning property
boundary could constitute contractual consideration.
160

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 340.
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any set of legal relations, or any set of (bilateral or multilateral) rights and duties.
Take the following example:
Example 8: A female employee (“E”) of a firm (“F”) decides
not to wear high-heeled shoes, in contravention of F’s code of
conduct. E does so with the intention of inciting F to terminate
her contract, so that she can draw media attention to gender
inequalities in F’s code of conduct. E goes to work wearing flat
shoes, and F does in fact terminate E’s contract.
In this example, E performs an act that is intended to “alter concretely the
normative relation” between herself and F; she intends to incite F to sack her.
Clearly, however, E’s act is not a contract. Contracts alter legal relations in a
specific way. The normative impact of a contractual agreement is the imposition
of a legal obligation in respect of the promised performance—in Example 7, to
write and deliver a manuscript, and to pay the agreed price.
Of course, performing the contract may affect the parties’ legal positions
in other ways. Performing the contract correctly will extinguish the rights and
duties that relate to performance. That performance may also involve the transfer
of a particular right, such as title to a book or (to use Werbach and Cornell’s
example of a conveyance) the transfer of title to a house. Performing incorrectly,
or not at all, may give rise to secondary rights and duties in respect of breach.
And if there is some defect in the intention of the contracting parties, the parties
may acquire the secondary, remedial right to unwind the transaction.
So, a contract is an agreement between two or more parties in respect of
some future performance, which gives rise to corresponding bilateral rights and
duties in respect of that performance. The execution of a contract entails various
derivative and distinct normative effects. These effects always include
extinguishing the right to performance (and the corresponding duty) and may
include the transfer of title or secondary, remedial rights and duties.161
2. Code and Contracts
Let us turn now to the contractual status of ordinary scripting code.
According to Savelyev, there is a fundamental similarity between the linguistic
structure of code, and that of contract: “computer code is based on statements
like “if ‘x’ then ‘y.’” “Such an approach is in harmony with contractual terms
and conditions.”162 This might encourage the conclusion that there is nothing
161
The former may exist without the latter, and vice versa. It is possible to have an agreement
that does not involve the change in ownership of any asset. Or one may hypothesize an agreement
in which one party agrees to mow the other’s lawn, in return for which the other will collect his
children from school 3 days a week. It is possible to have a change in ownership of an asset without
an exchange of promises: a gift is of this kind.
162
Savelyev, supra note 11, at 126; see also Lord Hodge, Justice, Supreme Court of the U.K.,
Financial Technology: Opportunities and Challenges to Law and Regulation at East China
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substantive that distinguishes code from the written text that might contain the
terms of a contractual agreement.163 There is, however, an important difference
between two kinds of conditions, which affects the conclusions that we may draw
about the constitute role of code.
The first type of condition is normative, and it is the one regularly
formalized by way of contract terms. Let us return to Example 1.1:
Example 1.1: S owns and runs a convenience store. Soda is
advertised for sale at a price of $1/can. B selects a can, hands $1
to S at the counter, and exits the store with the drink.
This relationship is normatively conditional: if x (payment of money) then S
promises to do y (transfer of soda). And because S promises to do y, we can say
that S ought to do y. B and S have formed an agreement involving an exchange
of promises that relate to performance.
The second type of condition is purely causal.164 Contrast Example 1.1
with Example 1.3:
Example 1.3: S owns and stocks a vending machine, in which
soda is offered for sale at a price of $1/can. B selects a can, puts
coins of the correct value in the slot, and recovers the drink from
a tray at the base.
Here, the connection between payment (input) and delivery (output) is
conditional: if x then y. But it is not normative. The vending machine is arational.
It cannot enter into agreements or respond to reasons. A vending machine simply
executes the terms of a contractual agreement between S and B. That contract,
we have seen, adopts the form of an open, unilateral offer, which is accepted
when B puts the coins into the slot.165 That transaction has the same sort of
normative impact as the conveyance. It transfers title to the drink to B, thereby
extinguishing the promissory obligation owed by S.

University of Political Science & Law, Shanghai, China, 14 (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-181026.pdf.
163
See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 342 (“Nothing, so far as we can tell, prevents
an expression of mutual assent from being formulated in code.”); see also Surden, supra note 82,
at 656 (“At a minimum, contract laws do not explicitly prohibit expressing contractual obligations
in terms of data. More affirmatively, basic contracting principles actively accommodate dataoriented representation.”). For a study of the habitual confusion of the legal document and the
instrument it encodes, see Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288,
1309 (2013); Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study
of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); Frederick Wilmot-Smith, Term Limits: What Is a
Term?, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming).
164
To be distinguished from an implicational relationship.
165

Supra Section II.A.2.
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This distinction is crucial to understanding the way in which computers
typically interact with legal norms. When we express contractual terms in
writing, we thereby “encode” the obligations created by an exchange of
promises. The contract specifies the parties’ rights and duties in relation to the
promised performance (“promissory duties”). Creation of the contract triggers
the moral and legal “ought”: S and B ought to do as their contract says. When
we translate those obligations into scripting code, we do so in the form of
instructions to a computer.166 We might say that the computer is “obliged to” or
“must” perform, so long as we are clear about what this means: the computer
cannot do otherwise than perform, given certain stipulations. If we say that the
computer “ought” to perform, we are no longer specifying a normative duty, but
simply a probabilistic prediction. While S and B are under a (moral and legal)
duty to perform, the computer simply has to perform.167
This is not to deny that it is literally possible to write “S is obliged to do
x” in code.168 Or otherwise, that if two computer-literate parties exchanged
copies of code until they reached a consensus as to the intended output, they
could thereby generate obligations to bring about the performance that the code
prescribes—without the need for an independent expression of their intent.169 It
is simply to be clear about the difference between specifying promissory duties
in the process of constituting a contract and discharging promissory duties in the
process of executing a contract.170

166

See Surden, supra note 82, at 658 (“The basic idea behind a computable contract term is to
create a series of actionable, computer-processable instructions that approximate what it is that the
parties are intending to do in their contractual arrangement.”).
167
Of course, we literally could add the term “obliged to” into code that is designed to execute
the contract, but it would be adding nothing to what we have already produced by setting up the
contract.
168
One Twitter user (Jason Morris @RoundTableLaw) kindly provided me with the following
example: “Obliged(A,ProvideGumballTo(B)) :- HasGumballs(A),InsertsQuarterInto(B,A).” With
this, it is apparently possible to ask “to whom is Jason obliged to provide gumballs?” Obliged
(Jason,ProvideGumballTo(?X)), and get a useful answer. Jason Morris (@RoundTableLaw),
TWITTER
(Dec.
13,
2018,
3:20
AM),
https://twitter.com/RoundTableLaw/status/1073175822737887232).
169
Given certain conditions, there may be advantages to generating rights and duties in this
way, though Surden describes in detail the types of obstacles that arise from the distinction between
“natural language” and computer code, some of which may be resolved by the use of devices such
as “threshold agreements” or “data standards.” See Surden, supra note 82, at 651–52.
170
Werbach and Cornell appear to draw something like this distinction:
As an analogy, if Bob balances a pail of water on top of a door, he does not
promise to drop water on whoever next opens the door. Rather, he has merely
set up the mechanical process by which that will inevitably happen. In a similar
way, a smart contract to transfer one Bitcoin upon such-and-such event
occurring is not really a promise at all. A smart contract would not say, “I will
pay you one Bitcoin if such-and-such happens,” but rather something like,
“you will be paid one Bitcoin if such-and-such happens.”
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 340.
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With this in mind, let us return to Example 2.2:
Example 2.2: an online newspaper accepts payment in Bitcoin.
If a reader (“B”) pays ₿0.01, B is automatically granted a onemonth subscription.
In this example, the code prescribes rules according to which a computer is to
perform a particular action, in discharge of a promissory duty generated by B’s
payment. The script is not itself a contract; it executes a contract.
Putting script on a blind consensus platform does not change the nature
of the normative interaction. Let us return to Example 3.1:
Example 3.1: S offers a cryptokitty (“Kitty 572634”) for sale for
Ξ1. S also uploads script that, when triggered by payment, will
cause the cryptokitty to be transferred to the buyer. B transfers
Ξ1 and receives Kitty 572634.
The essence of a contract is to create rights and duties with respect to
performance. Persistent script does not encode (though it may execute)
promissory obligations. It is not, therefore, a contract. As above, the code
executes the underlying contract.171
3. Code and Ownership
In Example 3.1, executing the code discharges S’s promissory duty to
transfer the cryptokitty.172 Indeed, it does so without permitting S to derogate
from contractual performance. Thus, it precludes any secondary, remedial rights
and duties that might otherwise arise from non-performance. Executing the code
may also affect the rights and duties entailed by legal ownership: Where once
Kitty 572634 belonged to S, now it belongs to B; where once one unit of Ether
belonged to B, now that unit belongs to S. But that title-transfer is not itself a
contract. The change in legal relations entailed by the transfer of ownership is
part of the normative fallout of contractual performance.
We are now in a better position to understand the claim that “There can
be little doubt that smart contracts purport to alter the rights of the parties. The
smart contract can explain, normatively as well as descriptively, why the Bitcoin
belongs to one party and not the other.”173 The code that effects a transfer of
ownership from one party to another does not constitute the contract between
transferor and transferee; it executes that contract. There remains an important
distinction between the exchange of promises and the instantiating code.

171
See also MICHÈLE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 25
(2019) (“A smart contract is, essentially, a sequence of instructions that a miner runs in exchange
for compensation.”).
172
Finck, supra note 11.
173

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 342 (emphasis added).
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Yet, the question of ownership is less straightforward than that claim
might belie. Whether the transaction does indeed affect the rights and duties
entailed by ownership depends upon whether, at the outset, the parties actually
“own” those assets in law. We might usefully distinguish, here, between two
kinds of digital asset. The first is an asset that represents some other real-world
asset. The second is an asset that only exists in a virtual environment.
For present purposes, a “symbolic asset” is an asset that represents
another real-world asset, and a “symbolic crypto-asset” is an asset that represents
another real-world asset, and which exists on a blind consensus platform. Take
the following example:
Example 9: S offers a car for sale for ₿5. B transfers ₿5 to S’s
wallet, thus triggering a program that grants access to the car via
e-key to B.
In such a case, the question of whether entitlement to the car has been transferred
is a legal question. The legal system is involved to determine (at minimum)
whether the transaction transfers ownership and to regulate cases of title-conflict.
One might argue that these questions can be settled in an extra-legal way.
Perhaps the law does not recognize the transfer as a valid car-sale. Nevertheless,
both parties are happy to treat it as if it were. This is conceptually possible, but
there are good reasons to think it impracticable. Unless S wishes to be saddled
with tax and insurance for the following year, S will want to ensure that B is the
registered keeper. If someone interferes with the car, B will want to be at the
helm of any legal suit. For so long as the legal system produces different answers
from the transactional matrix of a blind consensus protocol, these sorts of issues
will arise.174
For present purposes, a “pure asset” is an asset that exists only in the
digital sphere. And a “pure crypto-asset” is an asset that exists only on a blind
consensus platform, or which has some other virtual manifestation. Bitcoin falls
into this category; so do cryptokitties:175
Example 3.1: S offers a cryptokitty (“Kitty 572634”) for sale for
Ξ1. S also uploads script that, when triggered by payment, will
cause the cryptokitty to be transferred to the buyer. B transfers
Ξ1 and receives Kitty 572634.
In our Example 3.1, the question of legal ownership is not straightforward.
Assuming that we can discharge the burden of identifying the appropriate

174
See Edmund Schuster, Assoc. Professor of Law, London Sch. of Econ., Proceedings of LSE
Law Seminar “Cryptoassets and the Law”: The Empty Promise of Cryptoassets and Smart
Contracts (Sept. 4, 2018), https://personal.lse.ac.uk/schustee/crypto.html.
175
And the digital land-holding platform known as “Decentraland.” See DECENTRALAND,
https://decentraland.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
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jurisdiction,176 each such jurisdiction may offer a different answer to the question
of whether a person may legally “own” a digital asset.177 If the relevant legal
system does not formally recognize the legal status of holding, it follows that the
transfer does not have an impact on the legal entitlement of the parties. If S and
B did not own Kitty 572634 and Ξ1 respectively before the exchange, they will
not own Ξ1 and Kitty 572634 afterwards.
However, it is worth emphasizing that the law does not exhaust the
possible normative effects of digital asset transfers. One of the best examples of
this is a case known as the “DAO heist,”178 upon which our Example 4 was
modelled:
Example 4: A set of interoperable scripts control digital wallets
to which platform users may commit funds during a designated
window. Those scripts are designed to direct a series of
investments over a fixed period of time, paying any investment
return to users in proportion to funds committed.
At the beginning of May 2016, members of the Ethereum community announced
the launch of the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (known as “the
DAO”), an application that was intended to operate like a venture capital fund.
During a specified period, anyone could send Ether to a special wallet address in
exchange for DAO tokens. The launch outstripped expectations, attracting
Ξ12.7m (then worth around $150m). On June 18, 2016, members noticed that
funds were disappearing from the DAO, and it transpired that a hacker had
initiated a series of transactions, known as a “recursive call exploit,” in which
the DAO paid Ether multiple times before the program could update its own
balance.
Following the hack, members were faced with a choice: either they could
accept its consequences or revise the transaction history (creating a “hard fork”)

176
See generally FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY AND
GOVERNING LAW: ISSUES OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY (March 2018), http://fmlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/dlt_paper.pdf.
177
The U.S. and the UK offer different approaches. In the UK, the conclusion has been firm:
digital assets cannot be owned. See, e.g., OBG v. Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 (appeal taken from Eng.);
Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 281 (appeal taken from
Eng.). For a workaround for unique assets, see Armstrong v. Winnington [2012] EWHC 10
(Appeal taken from Eng.). In the U.S., unique digital assets such as domain names can be the object
of claims to protect property. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Registering a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office. It informs
others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one else’s.”).
178
See Michael del Castillo, The DAO Hacker Is Getting Away, COINDESK (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-dao-hacker-getting-away-classic; Samuel Falkon, The Story
of the DAO—Its History and Consequences, MEDIUM (Dec. 24, 2017),
https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences-71e6a8a551ee;
Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed that the DAO Was All Too Human, WIRED (June
18, 2016, 4:38 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-human/.
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that would allow participants to recover Ether from the DAO. That question was
a normative one: who ought to be entitled to the Ether captured by the heist?
Those who opposed the hard fork argued that the hack had occurred within the
rules of the DAO and should be left alone. This type of claim has come to be
known as “immutability,” and its thrust is that the code governs every aspect of
the transactional infrastructure; there is no room for additional “soft” values.179
Those who supported the hard fork argued that there was something ethically
impermissible about the hacker’s actions, which the community’s response
ought to reflect. Ultimately, a majority of miners were convinced to implement
the fork. For those running the new software, the DAO hack had never happened,
and the participants recovered their funds.180
Thus, the rules that govern the transfer of digital assets express
normative commitments. Those commitments may be external (legal) or internal
(otherwise an expression of the social consensus of a particular group), but they
cannot be avoided.
4. Language Games
Wittgenstein famously argued that there is no reason to look for one
essential “core” of a word’s meaning that is common to all uses of that word.181
Instead, he claimed, we should acknowledge a “complicated network of
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing,”182 admitting into these categorical
definitions examples that bear only “family resemblances” to one another.183 It
would appear that lawyers and programmers are content to use “smart contract”
in this sort of way—confident that there is some sufficiently-overlapping
meaning in the different uses of the term to elucidate broader questions about
utility, efficiency, risks, etc. There are reasons to think this confidence
misplaced. In particular, two types of missteps have emerged from the
confluence of fields.
First, the ideas of positive and negative automation have become
muddled. Lawyers laud the advantages of contractual automation but suggest

179

See WERBACH, supra note 17, at 492–94; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 327.
See Michael del Castillo, Ethereum Executes Blockchain Hard Fork to Return DAO Funds,
COINDESK (July 20, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-executes-blockchain-hard-forkreturn-dao-investor-funds.
180

181
182

See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953).
Id. at 66.

183
Id. For instance, we feel wholly comfortable discussing the concept of a “game,” without
ever requiring consensus upon identifiable pre-requisites: “game” might describe a two-player
game, but also includes solitaire; “game” might describe a game of skill, or one of chance.
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that blockchain technology is required to underpin this sort of smart contract.184
This conceptual chimera is a positively-automated smart contract underpinned
by a blind consensus protocol. I sought to show in Part II of this article that
persistent script is not necessary to facilitate positive automation. Permissioned
ledgers support positively-automated contracts.
The second problem has been the focus of Part III so far. The idea that
smart contracts oust legal oversight has led to the conclusion that programs are
able to carry the bulk of the normative weight: programs are contracts, operating
in tandem with traditional promissory relationships.185 The purpose of this
section has been to show that persistent script is not itself a contract, though it
may execute a contract. And in so doing, it may have a number of other (legal or
alegal) normative effects.
At this juncture, we may return to Figure 2:

Plastic script

Positively automated contract

Persistent script

Negatively-automated contract

= smart contract
“Smart contract” may refer to persistent script, or it may refer to a legal
contract that is implemented through persistent or plastic script. It cannot at once
refer to both. Contracts and code interact in complex and nuanced ways, but there
are reasons to maintain, rigorously, the conceptual boundaries between them.
B. Smart Contracts and the Law of Contract
We are now in a position to turn to the relationship between persistent
script and the institutional law of contract. Here, Werbach and Cornell make their
second taxonomic claim. They argue that smart contracting does not interact

See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 234–35 (“Smart ‘contracts’ are self-executing agreements
that exist as a set of instructions to a computer . . . . This has been made possible by the advent of
distributed ledger technology.”).
Fundamentally, a “smart contract” is a set of coded computer functions . . .
[which] allows self-executing computer code to take actions at specified times
and/or based on reference to the occurrence or non-occurrence of an action or
event . . . . The smart contract is stored and operates on Blockchain.
See A Primer on Smart Contracts, supra note 28.
184

185

See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 343.
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directly with, but rather stands in an “orthogonal” relationship to, contract law.186
For Werbach and Cornell, smart contracts are contracts that exist outside the
boundaries of the law.
In what follows, I challenge both the remedial view of contract law and
the claim that smart contracts completely oust legal oversight. I argue that smart
contracting adversely affects the ability of contract law to support valuable
relationships of trust and reliance.
1. What Is Contract Law?
Werbach and Cornell argue that contract law exists primarily “to
adjudicate the justice of a situation ex post,”187 rather than to “alter our reasons
going forward.”188 This, they say, lies at the heart of the distinction between
“smart contracts” (understood as a type of non-executory contract) and the law
of contract (understood as a set of institutional responses to promises). Werbach
and Cornell begin their discussion by imagining the following scenario: Abby
promises Bob that she will pay back Bob’s loan to her.189 By promising, they
say, “Abby creates a moral obligation. She now has a special sort of reason to
pay the money back.”190 They continue: “Contract law does not change anything
about Abby’s obligations. Those were complete the moment that she
promised.”191 Instead, contract law “enables an avenue for Bob to complain if
Abby does not fulfil her obligations.”192 The law of contract is, in short, a
remedial institution.193 The impact of smart contracts, they say, is to “eliminate
the act of remediation by admitting no possibility of breach.”194 Thus, they
conclude: “[I]t is apparent that smart contracting does not even purport to do
what contract law does. The two have fundamentally different objectives. Smart
contracting functions to ensure action. Contract law functions to recognize and
remedy grievances.”195 For Werbach and Cornell, smart contracts are legal
contracts that (somewhat paradoxically) exist outside of the law of contract.196
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Id. at 363.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.

192

Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 361 (“[C]ontract law is a fundamentally remedial institution, not aimed at creating
new reasons to perform, but aimed at resolving disputes, taking those reasons as already given.”).
194
Id. at 318.
193

195

Id. at 363.
Id. (“[S]mart contracting does not even purport to do what contract law does. The two have
fundamentally different objectives. Smart contracting functions to ensure action.”).
196
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This, I think, raises an important point about the way in which we
conduct the taxonomic exercise. We might categorize according to the “formal
structure”197 of a claim. For instance, “[a] wrong is a breach of a duty owed to
someone else . . . . The law of torts is concerned with the secondary obligations
generated by the infringement of primary rights.”198 According to this sort of
categorization, the law of torts and contract belong together;199 both are part of
the corrective enterprise entailed by undoing breaches of duties, whatever the
justificatory basis of that enterprise.
This clearly is not what Werbach and Cornell have in mind. For those
authors, it is important that the law of contract responds to breaches of specific
types of obligation, which are those generated by a promise.200 So, they care not
just about the formal pattern of the law, but also about the source of the legal
obligation. But this begs a further question: Why does it matter that the
obligation to which the law of contract responds is promissory? What makes
promises special?
It is widely accepted that those who practice the law must “treat like
cases alike.”201 At its most basic, this demands that we have some sense of what
counts in favor of a particular treatment: on what basis are we to say that it is
relevant that a case involves a promise, but that it is not relevant that the promise
was made on a Monday, rather than a Tuesday (or any other day of the week)?
That distinction is a normative one. The similarities and differences between two
cases are discerned by reference to the reasons why a particular legal response
ought to follow.202

197
198

Frederick Wilmot-Smith, Reasons? For Restitution?, 79 MOD. L. REV. 1116, 1118 (2016).
ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 2 (2007).

199

The norms in this second set can be unified even if they are justified by quite
different reasons or protect different interests. On Stevens’ model of torts, for
example, the norms are unified regardless of the reasons for the primary rights:
contractual rights arise due to voluntary undertakings; rights to physical
integrity arise regardless of voluntary undertakings.
See Wilmot-Smith, supra note 197, at 1118.
200

Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 361–63.
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961); ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE
AGE OF PLURALISM 183–97 (2007).
202
Webb argues,
Cases which differ in various respects are nonetheless alike if their shared
features, however few, are sufficient to require their like treatment . . . . [W]e
can determine whether cases really are alike only by inquiring into what
reasons bear on their proper treatment. Their likeness is then a function of the
reasons that apply alike to them . . .
CHARLIE WEBB, REASONS AND RESTITUTION 44–45 (2016).
201
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Different types of justification are offered for the rights and duties that
contract law supports, and the way in which it supports them.203 For some,
contract law meets demands of individual autonomy; it responds to the desire to
create the greatest possible range of free will.204 For others, the law of contract
seeks to maximize welfare (where “welfare” can mean wealth, happiness or
some other aspect of wellbeing).205 But all such explanations share a common
emphasis: whatever is the precise justificatory basis for the law of contract, it
concerns the voluntariness of the parties’ arrangement.206 Contracts embed
(support or constitute) voluntary obligations.207
Thus, the claim that the law of contract is “remedial” does not excuse us
from enquiring into the justification for a particular remedial response that
belongs to the category of contract law. Whichever form it takes, that
justification relates to the choices through which individuals shape their own
affairs. With this in mind, let us turn to the relationship between smart
contracting and the law of contract.
2. Smart Contracting and Contract Law
We saw above that the second step of Werbach and Cornell’s analysis is
whether that smart contracts preclude legal remedial oversight. Smart contracts
“eliminate the act of remediation,” they say, “by admitting no possibility of
breach.”208 There is one sense in which this is clearly true. We have seen that the
unique feature of persistent script is that (once uploaded) the code cannot be
altered and (once triggered) it cannot be prevented from executing. I have called
this “negative automation.” To the extent that persistent script performs a legal
contract, it precludes the remedial obligations that might otherwise arise from
mis-performance.209

203

For a summary, see RADIN, supra note 158; STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY Part II
(2004); MICHEAL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1997).
204
See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(1981); Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS
118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
205
For the view that this utility is wealth, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
206
See generally FRIED, supra note 204; P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES MORALS, AND LAW (1981);
T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default
Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980);
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
207
208
209

Joseph Raz, Promises and Morality in Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 933 (1982).
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 318.
Or non-performance.
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But there are other things that may go wrong with a contract. There may,
for instance, be problems with contract formation. Where a contract is entered
into by mistake, on the basis of some fraudulent misrepresentation or other
unconscionable conduct, it may be open to the party affected to unwind the
transaction. This sort of remedy is known as rescission,210 and the task of
restoring the parties to the financial position in which they were prior to the
transaction is called “restitution.”211 We can exemplify rescission and restitution
by returning to Example 7:
Example 7: A and B agree that A will write and deliver a
manuscript about World War II by July 5, 2022; B will pay A
$1000 in advance, $1000 on receipt of the completed
manuscript.
Let us imagine that A has represented to B that A is a law professor, and B makes
the contract on this basis. In fact, A is a first-year student in linguistics. And let
us suppose that B discovers the truth after paying the $1000 advance. At this
point, A may choose to rescind (unwind) the contract and seek restitution (return)
of the $1000.
It is often said that transactions that occur within the context of a blind
consensus protocol are “irrevocable.”212 But the inability of one or both of the
parties to undo the transaction in specie does not preclude restitution.213 In fact,
this happens often: a payment instruction is irrevocable once acted upon by
participating banks, but a payor may nevertheless obtain a money award that
restores payor and payee to their pre-payment position. In principle, that remedy
is accessible to those who use smart contracts. The aggrieved party in each of the
following examples (each of which has occurred in practice in many different
forms) could, in principle, sue for restitution:
Example 3.2: S offers a cryptokitty (“Kitty 572634”) for sale for
Ξ1. B accidentally transfers Ξ10 to S’s wallet, which triggers a
program that transfers Kitty 572634 to B.
Example 3.3: S offers a cryptokitty (“Kitty 572634”) for sale for
Ξ1. B transfers Ξ1 to S’s wallet, which triggers a program that—

210

See generally DOMINIC O’SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF RESCISSION (2012).
Id.; see also CHARLES MITCHELL ET AL., GOFF & JONES: THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(2016).
212
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 335 (“Even though blockchain transactions are
irrevocable, there are ways to build in more flexibility. There is no technical means, short of
undermining the integrity of the entire system, to unwind a transfer. It is, however, possible to
incorporate logic into a smart contract that permits exceptions or conditions.”).
213
We already offer these avenues of recourse for ordinary financial transactions: once acted
upon by participating banks, payment instructions are technically irrevocable; nevertheless, parties
can either sue their counterparty directly, or obtain the help of their banks, in order to recover the
financial equivalent of reversing the transaction in specie.
211
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because of a flaw in its code—transfers Kitty 572634, Kitty
572635, and Kitty 572636 to B.
Example 3.4: S offers a new type of crypto-coin, a “KittyCoin,”
for sale at a price of Ξ0.1, promising that each coin will rise in
value ten-fold once S’s new digital cat-grooming parlour is
launched. B buys 100 KittyCoins. S has no intention of
launching a digital cat-grooming parlour, and the KittyCoins
become worthless.
While it is not possible to alter the code itself, it is possible to correct the
imbalance created by the defect in formation or performance. In Example 3.2, S
could be required to pay B Ξ9 or its money-equivalent. In Example 3.3, B could
be required to retransfer Kitty 572635 and Kitty 572636 or pay S their monetary
value. And in Example 3.4, S could be required to restore Ξ10 or its monetary
equivalent to B. But here, it is important to note that the use of persistent script
raises practical questions concerning how easy it is for parties to access the law’s
remedial infrastructure.
Three types of obstacles may arise. The first and simplest goes to the
lack of operational control over persistent script. Even if the mistake in Example
3.3 is known to S prior to contractual performance, S’s only recourse is to sue
after the fact. This is the function of negative-automation: no one can interfere
with performance. And this is where parties may face their second problem,
which concerns the ability to identify one’s counterparty. Bitcoin and Ethereum
permit users to transact pseudonymously so that few actually know the realworld identity of the counterparty. That identity is almost always practically
impossible to ascertain.214 And the inability to identify one’s counterparty is, of
course, an insuperable obstacle to any putative legal claim.215
The third obstacle, which I address in detail in the final section of this
article, concerns disintermediation. Traditional intermediaries often play a key
role in both preventing and solving problems with contract formation.
Consumers must take cautionary steps before executing payments, and banks
will unwind payments obtained through fraud or by mistake. Retail platforms
such as Amazon and eBay offer a broad and flexible remedial infrastructure,
providing effective insurance against contractual performance that mismatches
the consumer’s expectations.

214
There are also heuristics through which sophisticated actors can narrow-down candidates,
but these tools are altogether inaccessible to consumers. See generally SARAH MEIKLEJOHN ET AL.,
A FISTFUL OF BITCOINS: CHARACTERIZING PAYMENTS AMONG MEN WITH NO NAMES (2013),
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1490261/1/Meiklejohn%20et%20al%20A%20fistful%20of%20bitcoin
s.pdf.
215
THE RULE OF CODE, supra note 8, at 85 (“The autonomous nature of smart contracts also
creates complications in commercial arrangements involving pseudonymous parties . . . . To file a
lawsuit, an injured party will need to know the identity of the opposing party.”). Of course, if
participants might be willing to retransfer the money, but you are beholden to the character of your
(unidentified) counterparty.
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In the absence of intermediaries, and in light of the difficulties of
counterparty identification, the risks associated with contractual defects (in
formation of the contract, or in the underlying code that executes it) must be
absorbed by the consumer.216 In the final Section of this paper, I consider how
this affects the overarching assessment of the merits of smart contracting; here,
our focus is upon how that practice relates to the law of contract.
In one sense, the goals of smart contracting and the law of contract align.
Persistent script offers an effective alternative mechanism for enforcing
promissory obligations. To the extent that negative automation limits the
potential for operational interference, contracting parties may be surer of
achieving their intended goal.217 Understood instrumentally, there is a natural
affinity between contract law and unbreakable contracts. Yet, there are also
important ways in which smart contracting frustrates the goals of contract law,
which go to the quality of the parties’ relationship.
The first concerns the nature of any ordinary contractual relationship that
may be generated by smart contracts. If the claim is that contract law is justified
when it supports valuable relationships of trust and confidence,218 eliminating
the need for trust in one’s counterparty erodes the qualities that make those
relationships valuable.219 We may distinguish here between “thick” and “thin”
trust. Thick trust exists in the context of a trusting relationship; parties have a
general confidence that their counterparty’s intentions conform to their outward
manifestation.220 Thin trust is mere confidence in counter performance.221 By
securing the latter, smart contracting obviates the former.
The second concerns the quality of a contractual relationship induced by
(negligent or fraudulent) misrepresentation, improper pressure, or some other

216
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, 346–47 (“With a smart contract, there is no one to
restrain, because the smart contract code is immutable once embedded in the blockchain. A smart
contract could even include terms that are illegal, unconscionable, or otherwise legally
unenforceable.”).
217

See id. at 360 (“[B]ecause the agreed-upon result occurs automatically, uncertainty about
performance, and about judicial recognition, disappears. A promisee no longer needs to wonder
whether the promise will be kept, or whether a court will recognize the breach.”).
218
What Saprai calls “trust-based cooperation.” PRINCE SAPRAI, CONTRACT LAW WITHOUT
FOUNDATIONS: TOWARDS A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CONTRACT (forthcoming 2019). Raz argues
that promises create a “special bond” between promisor and promise. Joseph Raz, Promises and
Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H. L. A. HART 210, 227–28
(P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977). Markovits prefers a theory of contract as an institutional
response to the need to “sustain collaborative agreements among individual persons.” Markovits,
supra note 206, at 1472.
219

On the process of that erosion in relation to boilerplate contracts, see RADIN, supra note

158.
220

So that their counterparty will in fact exclude (most) reasons against performance.
Though he does not put it thus, see DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A
LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (2005).
221
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unconscionable conduct.222 We saw above that all theories of contract relate in
some way to the underpinning consent of the contracting parties.223 Thus, the law
of contract not only encourages parties to abide by their promises; it also contains
a range of mechanisms for allowing the parties to escape from ill-formed
contracts and oppressive terms. To the extent that smart contracting makes it
harder for parties to escape transactions that do not embody any of the (intrinsic
or instrumental) relational virtues that the law of contract upholds, that practice
comes into direct conflict with the goals of contract law.
Thus, the practice of smart contracting does interact with the law of
contract, and there are reasons to think that that interaction will not always be a
harmonious one. Here, we arrive at the broader question that lies at the heart of
this analysis: do smart contracts enhance individual sovereignty, or is the price
of removing those contractual safeguards too high?
C. Are Smart Contracts a Good Thing?
In what follows, I consider the benefits and risks to consumers of
different types of transactional automation, in order to isolate those which
concern negative automation. I shall leave to one side the problems that arise
from uncertainties in legal classification;224 these problems arise wherever
technology outpaces legal evolution. I argue in what follows that the problems
smart contracting seeks to solve are largely illusory, and that the harms (an
increased vulnerability to fraud and hacking, and a lack of remedial recourse) are
real and serious.
1. Positively-Automated Contracts
There are various ways in which contractual agreement and performance
may be automated. Some of those methods are digital: infrastructure, education,
utilities, and commerce all rely upon a nuanced network of self-operating,
interdependent computer processes. This sort of automated contractual
performance is commonplace, and it is crucial to much of what we do on a dayto-day basis.225 I may also bind myself digitally to create a future agreement: if I
enter a maximum eBay bid, I thereby trigger a program that will enter a bid on
my behalf if I am outbid.226 Some of those methods are contractual: when the
end of the initial term of a tenancy agreement or gym contract arrives, the

222
223
224
225

Or simply on the basis of an ordinary causative mistake.
Supra note 206 and accompanying text.
Though these problems may have a significant impact on the capacity of the law to respond.
Whether, for example, travelling to work, buying coffee, or streaming media.

226
It is now well-documented that the so-called “Internet of Things” promises the ability to
instantiate these sorts of agreements more broadly, allowing, for example, household devices to
reorder goods in an automated fashion.
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agreement will usually “roll over,” binding the parties to a month-by-month
contract. Automatic agreement may shape the entire contractual arrangement, or
it may shape only part of it: many service-providers require consumers to provide
blanket consent to fundamental unilateral variations in price or service.
The efficiency gains of contractual automation are well-understood;227
many services would be wholly unworkable without it. But whenever consumers
bind themselves to some future agreement, or otherwise give up control over
some part of their contract, questions arise concerning the long-term impact of
that arrangement. Free trials regularly seduce consumers to enter into contracts
that they (legally or practically) cannot quit, and consumers often discover that
they are bound to some contract that (as a result of some unilateral variation on
the part of their service-provider) looks little like the one to which they originally
agreed. Where the consumer is particularly vulnerable or occupies a bargaining
position of relative weakness, this concern is aggravated.228
Moreover, the remedial consequences of performance can be automated
in such a way as to tilt the balance of power between the parties.229 At the outset
of this paper, I considered the example of an instalment-plan supported by a
program that would transfer the car’s e-key to the owner if the buyer defaulted.
Such an arrangement may be more efficient, but it places a great deal of power
in the hands of the owner. The consequences of any (however small) delay in
payment are stark and inevitable. The greater the importance of the asset to one’s
personal life, the greater the impact of default.230
So, while self-operating machines form a crucial part of our lives, they
also raise serious risks of harm. Those risks do not always elicit appropriate
caution from consumers; Radin identifies a “heuristic bias” that tends to produce
over-optimism when it comes to assessing contractual risk.231 There have been a
range of institutional responses to that heuristic bias;232 those responses are more
or less cognizant of the subtler ways in which consumers may be “nudged”233

227
See LESSIG, supra note 4; see also BARTLETT, THE DARK NET, supra note 45; BARTLETT,
THE PEOPLE VS TECH, supra note 45; JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? (2014); JARON
LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO (2011).
228
See RADIN, supra note 158.
229
See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9, at 124–25 (“Networked door locks on a shared
car [through a system] such as Zipcar could automatically open, but only for that individual, that
paid the access fee. Or, a lessor could shut off a delinquent lessee’s access to a leased car, and give
access to the bank, but only until full payment of the principal.”).
230
One might imagine a mortgage agreement for a house on such terms; the impact of default
would leave an individual homeless.
231

RADIN, supra note 158, at 26–29.
From regulating actors directly and enhancing consumer recourse to supporting competitors
via accelerator programs.
233
I mean this in the technical sense. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2009) (“A nudge, as
232
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towards particular actions that may enable them to exercise meaningful control
over contracts.
Let us turn, now, to the benefits and risks created by the ability to access
contractual structures that, by relying upon persistent script, preclude either party
from interfering with contractual performance.
2. Negatively-Automated Contracts
Above, I identified two features that set the vending machine apart from
an automated asset-transfer program: First, confidence in counter performance
does not depend upon the reputation of any particular counterparty; and, second,
sale can be executed without intermediaries at the point of purchase. By placing
operational control outside the hands of any individuals, smart contracting
removes these differences. Yet, shifting trust from one’s counterparty to a
(digital or physical) machine is an advantage to the consumer only if three
propositions are true: first, counterparties and intermediaries do not warrant
one’s trust; second, the machine does warrant trust; and, third, there are no other
downsides that might outweigh the advantages of negative automation.234 Let us
start with the first proposition.
The question of trust is fundamentally context sensitive. In Episode 76
of Blockchain Insider,235 Vitalik Buterin posits a scenario in which the auction
host of a platform like eBay colludes with a seller to artificially inflate the price
of an asset. The host has access to all maximum bids and might (Buterin
imagines) “bid up” an asset. Buterin argues that Ethereum, by precluding such
interference, offers greater transparency and reliability.236 He imagines a twostage model: at stage one, everyone publishes invisible commitments to bid; at
stage two, those bids are revealed.237
There are, of course, clear advantages to sellers in having the capacity to
manage the auction in a more nuanced way, and there are clear advantages to
both parties in having recourse to the platform in the event of questions or
concerns. The question is whether there is a sufficient risk of manipulation that

we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges
are not mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.”)
234
Werbach asks:
[W]hat needs does the blockchain address, either for the first time or in new ways? . . . The benefits
of these systems come with significant costs, not least of which are their novelty and immaturity.
If an existing technology can do the same thing, it is likely to be the better approach.
WERBACH, supra note 17, at 73.
235
236
237

Ep. 76. Vitalik Buterin, BLOCKCHAIN INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2018), https://bi.11fs.com/78.
Id.
Id.
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buyers would prefer Buterin’s disintermediated model—or in other words,
whether platforms do set out to defraud their buyers.
By and large, the answer to that question will be no; the reputational
costs of mismanagement are far too high. This is more obviously true wherever
there exists a strong supportive system of regulatory oversight. And if the answer
is no, there is very little to be gained by designing contracts in such a way as to
preclude this sort of intermediation. But let us assume, arguendo, that there are
exceptions to that conclusion—that there are enough nefarious commercial
actors, supported by weak regulatory oversight, for consumers to wish for a real
alternative. The question, then, is whether blind consensus platforms offer a
more trustable alternative?
One method for upsetting the otherwise-predictable outcomes of smart
contracts concerns hacking. Malicious computer hacking is the exploitation of
some loophole in the code of a particular program or application in order to
execute a function that was not intended by the program’s creators.238 Whenever
computers carry out commercial activity, there is always a risk of this sort of
interference, but commercial and governmental bodies have sufficient resources
to build systems that are immune to most attacks, can respond quickly to any
attack that does occur, and have deep enough pockets to compensate consumers
from any untoward effects. Those who build applications on blind consensus
protocols do not generally have access to an equivalent breadth and depth of
financial and technological resource. We have already witnessed one fairly
catastrophic impact of this problem, in the context of the DAO heist.239
Of course, we also saw how the community responded to that attack:
enough miners implemented the software update to provide a new chain, which
restored the funds to the DAO and allowed them to be recovered by users. 240
There are reasons to applaud Ethereum’s community for reaching a solution, but
there are also reasons for worrying about the way in which it was reached. In
particular, the method (a great deal of informal discussion on online fora)241 is
far too cumbersome to be implemented in the vast majority of cases. Moreover,
the solution was altogether ad hoc. Nothing is assured by way of systematic
remedial capability, and there are no formal systems of government to implement
such capability.242

238

Hacking, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/26361/hacking (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019) (“Hacking generally refers to unauthorized intrusion into a computer or a network.
The person engaged in hacking activities is known as a hacker. This hacker may alter system or
security features to accomplish a goal that differs from the original purpose of the system.”).
239
The DAO hack ran into several million dollars, and substantially shook confidence in the
Ethereum network. See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text.
240
Id.
241

Finley, supra note 178.
On the governance question, see Vitalik Buterin, Notes on Blockchain Governance, VITALIK
BUTERIN (Dec. 17, 2017), https://vitalik.ca/general/2017/12/17/voting.html; Vili Lehdonvirta, The
242
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This is not the first time these questions of self-government have arisen.
In 1999, Lawrence Lessig described LambdaMOO, a text-based virtual reality
world.243 One of the players, “Mr_Bungle,” developed the ability to co-opt the
voices and actions of other characters.244 The player used this power to violate
those characters, and to make it appear that they were enjoying the experience.245
The community response was one of outrage.246 When the creators of the game
(the “Wizards”) refused to intervene, some of the players met to discuss the
matter in a virtual forum.247 Eventually, one of them took matters into his own
hands, deleting the account associated with Mr_Bungle.248 Lessig wrote that
“[t]here is a certain romance tied to the idea of [this sort of] democracy,” but
“LambdaMOO’s move to self-government, through structures of democracy,
was not just an achievement. It was also a defeat. The space had failed. It had
failed, we could say, to self-regulate.”249
These criticisms are just as apt for Ethereum, though the nature of
blockchain technology tends to obscure the processes of government.250 Of
course, those who contribute to (by writing, by implementing, or otherwise by
influencing) the code of blind consensus platforms could come up with more
robust, systematic methods of self-government. However, these communities
have expressed a strong and growing commitment to “immutability,”251
promoting the indelibility of transactions and freedom from government,
anarchy, not technocracy.252 It now seems likely that a large-scale hack would
elicit no solution at all, ad hoc or otherwise.
So, blind consensus platforms increase vulnerabilities to hacking and
offer fewer opportunities to resolve problems that may arise as a result of

Blockchain Paradox: Why Distributed Ledger Technologies May Do Little to Transform the
Economy, OXFORD INTERNET INST. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/blog/theblockchain-paradox-why-distributed-ledger-technologies-may-do-little-to-transform-theeconomy/; Vlad Zamfir, Against On-Chain Governance Refuting (and Rebuking) Fred Ehrsam’s
Governance Blog, MEDIUM (Dec. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/against-on-chaingovernance-a4ceacd040ca.
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249
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LESSIG, supra note 4, at 74–78.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77.
See Lehdonvirta, supra note 242.
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See supra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
But see Mike Hearn, The Resolution of the Bitcoin Experiment, MIKE’S BLOG (Jan. 14,
2016), https://blog.plan99.net/the-resolution-of-the-bitcoin-experiment-dabb30201f7.
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hacking.253 In this sense, they are less trustable than their intermediated
alternatives. Finally, let us turn to the third question: in what follows, I consider
whether there are any (other) downsides to negative automation, which outweigh
the putative benefits.
We have already seen that, even if one can have confidence that code
will execute as it has been set up, there are still very many things that may go
wrong with a coded contract. One party may act fraudulently or unconscionably,
or one or more of the parties may be mistaken about the contract itself, or the
conditions in which it is to be performed.254 The legal system offers a variety of
remedial mechanisms. Some (we have seen) permit parties to return themselves
to the nearest approximation of the position in which they were prior to the
contract. Others allow the parties to set aside or otherwise adjust unfair contract
terms.255
This formal architecture is supported by a variety of powerful and
flexible non-law mechanisms. Some of those mechanisms are prophylactic:
security enhancements in banking protect consumers from fraudsters, and a
screening process is conducted by companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and Amazon
to ensure that consumers are not exposed directly to harmful actors. Some of
those mechanisms are remedial: each of these companies provides compensation
in the event that a wrongful transaction does occur. There are many reasons to
think that consumers value this remedial infrastructure a great deal,256 and that
the ability to enter into contracts that absorb risk is an asset.
It bears emphasis that these intermediaries often offer a solution, not
because of any legal obligation, but because they wish to establish or maintain a
particular reputation. Banks are not obliged to, but often will, recover funds paid
by mistake; Amazon is not obliged to, but often will, refund the price of
253
See Bruce Schneier, There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology, WIRED (Feb.
6, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchaintechnology/ (“What blockchain does is shift some of the trust in people and institutions to trust in
technology. You need to trust the cryptography, the protocols, the software, the computers and the
network. And you need to trust them absolutely, because they’re often single points of failure.
When that trust turns out to be misplaced, there is no recourse. . . . In many ways, trusting
technology is harder than trusting people. Would you rather trust a human legal system or the
details of some computer code you don’t have the expertise to audit?”).
254

Moreover, a substantial imbalance in the relative bargaining position of the parties may
produce a set of terms that prejudice the weaker party.
255

Here, different jurisdictions produce different answers. The U.S. has a doctrine of
unconscionability. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965). On the other hand, the UK has narrower doctrines of duress and undue influence, and the
statutory framework embodied in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (Eng.).
256
Stinchcombe, Ten Years In, supra note 67 (“With all the money spent on bitcoin cash
registers, nobody went out and did a survey about whether most credit card users would be willing
to give up their frequent flyer miles in return for also losing the ability to dispute a transaction.”).
It is worth noting that very many so-called blockchain-based applications in fact rely on
intermediaries. See WERBACH, supra note 17, at 74.
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marketplace goods that do not meet the buyer’s expectations. In this sense, the
trust that one places in an intermediary—far from acting as a disadvantage—can
be an invaluable bargaining chip.
We have seen that smart contracts preclude access to much of this
remedial infrastructure.257 Parties who transact on a peer-to-peer basis must rely
on the cooperation of their counterparty in the event of any mishap in contract or
code formation. Parties who cannot identify their counterparty cannot sue to
enforce that cooperation at all.258 Without the many safeguards implemented by
traditional intermediaries, parties are more exposed to harm, and without the
remedial mechanisms of intermediation, most parties will be wholly unable to
fix that harm.
Here, limits in programmatic capability bite with particular ferocity.
Recognizing the possibility of the kinds of problem under consideration here,
Szabo argued that certain “hardship and operational” controls might usefully be
“coded in” to smart contracts.259 It is not altogether clear what he meant by this,
and there are good reasons why these sorts of controls have not emerged. Not
only is it extremely difficult to identify in advance all of the events that might
frustrate the parties’ plans, the question of whether someone’s intention was in
fact impaired at the time of contract formation is a question poorly-suited to
resolution by computer code.260
There are, in sum, good reasons for consumers to prefer to place trust in
cognizable counterparties and intermediaries, where these actors are able to
insure against the very many ways in which a contract may go wrong. Rather
than trying to remove trust from digital commerce, we might better focus our

See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 85 (“[R]obust common law and civil law
doctrines—such as unconscionability and incapacitation—soften the blow of contracts that contain
lopsided or unfavorable terms. In the context of smart contracts used to govern transactions
between pseudonymous parties, however, injured parties likely will lack the ability to rely on these
defenses, possibly encouraging the deployment of smart contract-based agreements that
disproportionately favor parties with greater bargaining power.”).
258
Organizations that are not directly within the control of any definable group of individuals
(such as the DAO) cannot easily be subjected to the regulatory oversight of any one national
Government.
257

259

Smart Contracts, supra note 7.
These questions are best suited to human judgment. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note
8, at 84 (“Smart contracts are not particularly well suited to accommodate legal arrangements that
are relational in nature. To implement a smart contract, parties need to precisely define
performance obligations . . . in many commercial transactions . . . obligations will likely prove
unpredictable, and smart contracts will not be able to provide parties with the flexibility to structure
their ongoing contractual relationships.”). Parties could specify a mutually trusted decisionmaker—but that serves to reintroduce precisely the possibility of intermediation that blind
consensus protocols are designed to oust.
260
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efforts upon mechanisms for making sure that that trust is well-placed.261 We
have seen that there is a great deal of value to consumers in the ability to see and
influence a company’s reputation.262 We ought to encourage, not eliminate, this
sort of method for improving transparency and accountability with respect to a
company’s commercial practices.263
At this juncture, I will express two predictions and one hope for the
future of digital contracting. The first prediction is that centralized and
intermediated mechanisms of contracting will prevail. We have already seen that
negative automation is extremely cumbersome.264 And we have also seen that
there are good reasons for companies to wish to retain control over their
contracts.265 If they rely upon shared programs and records, it will be in the
context of permissioned protocols; they will not use a wholly-open process of
transaction verification.266
The second prediction is of an even greater shift to standardizing
contracts. This is sometimes expressed as “modularity.”267 That, in turn, is
presented as an advantageous feature for consumers and small businesses.268 The
claim is that traditionally weaker parties may select their contractual text
(without recourse to lawyers).269 Yet, more modularity does not entail greater
choice for consumers. The phenomenon of “boilerplate contracts” shows that
companies may present the contractual text as a fait accompli.270
The hope is that we will design our contractual systems to accommodate
imperfect rationality, foresight, and bargaining power. This, of course, means
regulating providers to ensure that consumers are given opportunities to exercise
meaningful control over their contracts. But it also means encouraging those who
seek to develop technologies that challenge the incumbent commercial

261
As Kai Stinchcombe puts it in Stinchcombe, Blockchain, supra note 67, “[i]nstead of
directing resources to the elimination of trust, we should direct our resources to the creation of
trust.”
262

In this sense, models of commerce that encourage pseudonymous or anonymous contracting
lack a valuable resource.
263

Some of these methods are legal; others are not. Systems of open review, which
crowdsource information, establish clear pictures about which commercial actors are worthy of
trust.
264
Proof of work is designed to be computationally intensive.
265
266
267
268

Stinchcombe, Ten Years In, supra note 67.
This prediction holds for both consumer and (higher-value) commercial contracts.
See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 80–83.
Id.

269

Id.
Nor does it necessarily entail less reliance on lawyers: like any other intermediary, a lawyer
is able to ensure the party against risk. Someone very well versed in property law and conveyancing
will ordinarily employ a lawyer to conduct the process simply so that they have an avenue of
recourse if something goes wrong.
270

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

55

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4

444

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122

infrastructure to think seriously about questions of ethics and (to that end)
government. We saw at the very outset of this article that the goals of this
experiment in contractual technology were to improve transparency and
accountability.271 Those are proper goals, but they should be stepping stones
towards a system that promotes trust. Better accountability ensures that
commercial actors behave in a more trustworthy fashion. More transparency
equips consumers to choose commercial actors that act in a trustworthy fashion.
A utopian future of commerce is not one in which consumers are held to
degenerate contracts; it is one that supports valuable relationships of trust and
cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolution of contracting is rarely presented as a story of consumer
empowerment. Rather, commentators emphasise the proliferation of
mechanisms that place control firmly in the hands of the party with the most
commercial clout.272 The phenomenon of smart contracting is supposed to buck
that trend. By immunizing contracts from operational interference, smart
contracts carve out a domain free from political and commercial influence.273
That sentiment ought to be understood in context. Bitcoin was built in the wake
of the 2008 financial crisis, when faith in financial intermediaries was at its
lowest ebb. But I have demonstrated that there is a substantial cost to removing
these intermediaries—and that cost is borne by consumers.
In Part II of this article, I explained how smart-contracting works, and
how it differs from existing tools for digital commerce. The crux of that
difference is the ability to take operational control out of the hands of powerful
counterparties and intermediaries. The problem smart-contracting sets out to
solve is the need to make digital contracts tamper-proof. And the “core case” of
a smart-contract is the solution—computer code that negatively automates
contractual performance. In Part III, I argued that negative automation does not
enhance consumer autonomy, nor make for better bargains. The ability to escape
from contracts in certain circumstances is a core part of the law’s commitment
to supporting valuable relationships of trust and reliance. By obviating “thick”
trust,274 and removing contractual safeguards, smart-contracts increase the
likelihood that parties will be bound inexorably to contracts that are wholly
lacking in the relational virtues supported by the law of contract.

271
272

Supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
See RADIN, supra note 158.

273
I put this in terms of “negative automation” and non-justiciability; the idea is that neither
intermediaries nor contracting parties can interfere with performance—during performance or
after.
274
Parties have a general confidence that their counterparty’s intentions conform to their
outward manifestation. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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When Lessig wrote his oft-quoted statement that “code is law,”275 he did
not argue that code should replace normative questions; quite the opposite. He
argued that those who built spaces for online interaction could choose to design
their code “to protect values that we believe are fundamental” or could “allow
those values to disappear.”276 As the computer sciences grow, so too must the
clamour of social scientists—that these values become a core part of
technological ambition.

275

LESSIG, supra note 4.

276

Id. at 6.
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